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The Forgotten Stewards of Higher
Education Quality
Matthew Adam Bruckner*
A “triad” of regulators is supposed to ensure that student loan borrowers are not harmed
by low-value institutions of higher education, including exploitative profiteers operating
fly-by-night or predatory institutions of higher education. The triad has failed. Millions of
students have borrowed billions of federal student loan dollars that they won’t ever repay,
causing borrowers to suffer needless economic harm and psychological anguish. But these harms
were, are, and remain mostly preventable. This Article appears to be the first law review
article to consider the states’ role in policing institutional quality and ensuring that student
borrowers are not preyed upon by low-value institutions of higher education. It suggests concrete
steps states could take, such as adopting a state version of financial responsibility scores, the
gainful employment rule, or a cohort default rate metric, to avoid being characterized as the
forgotten stewards of higher education quality.

* Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. This Article was inspired by Tariq
Habash of the Student Borrower Protection Center. It benefitted from the comments received in
connection with presentations at the “Consumer Protection in the Age of the Student Debt Crisis”
symposium at UC Irvine School of Law and to the 2020 AALS Annual Meeting’s student loan
discussion group. I would like to thank Christopher Bradley, Yan Cao, Seth Frotman, Tariq Habash,
Michael Itzkowitz, Angela Perry, Carla Reyes, Aníbal Rosario Lebrón, and Ramsi Woodcock for their
comments, ideas, and suggestions. Research assistance was provided by Eri Aguilar, Victoria Capatosto,
Elizabeth Gabaud, Paul Lisbon, and Zoe Nwabunka. As always, this Article would not have been
possible without my wife’s support. (Thanks Morgan!) Research support was provided by Howard
University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 18, 2019, a receiver was appointed to oversee the colleges operated
by Dream Center Education Holdings (Dream Center), including various colleges
run under the Art Institute, Argosy, and South University brands.1 Dream Center’s
receivership followed the mysterious disappearance of millions of dollars earmarked
for student borrowers.2 By mid-March, most Dream Center institutions had closed,
compelling students to transfer to other institutions to complete their degree or to
drop out entirely.3
Obviously, Dream Center’s closure took a substantial toll on its students.4 For
students who intended to continue their studies, they were forced to find another

1. Ashley A. Smith, Nonprofit Dream Center Institutions Placed in Receivership, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/21/nonprofit-dream-centerinstitutions-placed-receivership [ https://perma.cc/Y255-WYA8 ].
2. Ben Unglesbee, Judge Orders End to Dream Center’s Ill-fated Receivership, EDUC. DIVE
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.educationdive.com/news/judge-orders-end-to-dream-centers-ill-fatedreceivership/553731/ [ https://perma.cc/292L-RXHK ].
3. See id.
4. Chris Quintana, A College Closed, Leaving Thousands Without a Degree. How to Keep It from
Happening to You, USA TODAY (Mar. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
education/2019/03/26/how-to-choose-a-college-argosy-university-college-closing/3211480002/
[ https://perma.cc/2PG9-L297 ] (relating one student’s “chaotic and emotional” experience of one
Argosy branch closing, and how the school’s closure “inflamed a chronic medical condition”); see also
Matthew Adam Bruckner, Higher Ed “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders, 106 KY. L.J. 223, 264 n.261 (2018)
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school willing to accept them and give them credit for their previous studies. But
transferring students often lose most of their credits.5 And if an institution of higher
education (IHE) suddenly closes, as Dream Center did, students may find it even
more difficult to transfer.6 For example, Dream Center inadvertently destroyed
some student records in the process of vacating the school’s previous office space.7
In addition, such students often need to physically move to another city, potentially
on short notice.8 On top of it all, sudden changes are often stressful for people.
Of course, some students will be unable or unwilling to transfer to a new
institution after their school closes.9 These students may drop out entirely.10
Ostensibly, these students are entitled to discharge their federal student-loan debt.11
But the U.S. Department of Education (ED or the Department) has failed to
promptly “discharge federal student loans of eligible students impacted by [all recent
IHE] closures.”12 This uncertainty must only compound the stress experienced by
students at closed schools.

[hereinafter Bruckner, DNRs] (“Moreover, it remains disruptive to a student’s education, even if the
now-closed school implements a so-called ‘teach out’ plan.”).
5. A 2017 Government Accountability Office report found that “students who transferred
from private for-profit schools to public schools . . . lost an estimated 94 percent of their credits.”
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-574, HIGHER EDUCATION: STUDENTS NEED MORE
INFORMATION TO HELP REDUCE CHALLENGES IN TRANSFERRING COLLEGE CREDITS 15 (2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686530.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3U7Y-5A3Q ].
6. See Rachel Leingang, Argosy University Is Withholding Financial Aid. Students Can’t Pay Their
Bills., USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/
2019/02/08/argosy-university-financial-aid-closing-receivership-accreditation/2817950002/ [ https://
perma.cc/T3RF-LFSF ].
7. Statement Regarding the Destruction of Education Training Files at Argosy University,
Atlanta Campus at 2–3, Digit. Media Sols., LLC v. S. Univ. of Ohio, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-145, 2019 WL
1958510 (N.D. Ohio May 2, 2019) (acknowledging that “the training records for (we believe) thirty
three clinical psychology students” were destroyed and that “likely the only way to replace this material”
is via a “cumbersome and unpleasant” process (for the students)).
8. See Unglesbee, supra note 2.
9. For example, Mount Ida College students were offered automatic admission to the University
of Massachusetts Dartmouth, but with the schools approximately seventy miles apart, transferring from
Mount Ida to Dartmouth was too much for some students. See generally Scott Jaschik, Another Small
College Closing: Mount Ida, After Trying for a Merger, Will Shut Down, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 9,
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/09/mount-ida-after-trying-merger-willshut-down [ https://perma.cc/2E2L-UG3E ] (“On social media, many current students said they felt
betrayed by the college’s announcement -- and that the option of enrolling at the University of
Massachusetts at Dartmouth was not viable for them. Depending on where in the Boston area Mount
Ida students live, the drive to Dartmouth is 70-85 miles. One student wrote on Facebook, ‘Are you
kidding me? . . . This is absolutely ridiculous. I chose Mount Ida because it was relatively close to my
home and near Boston. Dartmouth is two hours away and doesn’t even have my major!’”).
10. See Unglesbee, supra note 2.
11. See Has Your School Closed? Here’s What to Do, FED. STUDENT AID, https://
studentaid.gov/announcements-events/closed-school [ https://perma.cc/YB6Z-PZU6 ] ( last visited
Sept. 23, 2020 ). And private student loan debt does not enjoy similar treatment.
12. Margaret Mattes, Lawsuit Calls on Department of Education to Provide Relief to Students
Whose Schools Closed, S TUDENT L OAN B ORROWER A SSISTANCE (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.
studentloanborrowerassistance.org/lawsuit-calls-on-department-of-education-to-provide-relief-tostudents-whose-school-closed/ [ https://perma.cc/2ZYT-QTSP ].
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Dream Center’s failure is just one of many high-profile failures that has caused
serious harm to its student population.13 Mount Ida College, Corinthian Colleges,
ITT Tech, DeVry, and Education Corporation of America all “collapsed,” which
affected tens of thousands of students.14 This “wave of institutional closures”
should force policymakers to consider how to protect students from suffering
similar harms at the hands of other institutions.15 Moreover, students may be
harmed in many other ways by IHEs.16 Although state governments are only one
leg of the regulatory triad intended to ensure that IHEs provide a high-quality
education to (and a good value for) students, they are currently best positioned to
take action to protect students.17 Neither ED nor accrediting agencies seem to be
up to the task or willing to perform their obligations. As such, this Article considers
what states can do on their own.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I expands upon this introduction by
explaining the harms wrought on students by our student loan system and low-value
IHEs. It argues that, under our current higher education funding regime, students
13. Even students who attended a Dream Center institution that didn’t close, such as students
at the Western State College of Law at Argosy University, suffered from the collapse of the wider
Dream Center enterprise. For example, these students never received their financial aid for the spring
2019 semester. Leingang, supra note 6 (explaining that as a result, “[s]tudents from campuses across the
country described missing rent payments, not being able to afford gas and food, not being able to afford
daycare for their children”).
14. “In 2014, Corinthian Colleges collapsed despite being in good standing with the Accrediting
Council for Independent Colleges and Schools (ACICS). A few years after that, ITT Tech followed suit,
and then Education Corporation of America and its 70 campuses.” CLARE MCCANN & AMY
LAITINEN, THE BERMUDA TRIAD: WHERE ACCOUNTABILITY GOES TO DIE 13 (2019) (citing Andrew
Kreighbaum, Collapse of For-Profit Chain Long in the Making, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 6, 2018)),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/12/06/closure-education-corporation-america-raisesquestions-about-oversight-and-support
[ https://perma.cc/E7LB-GVTM ]),
https://
www.newamerica.org/education-policy/reports/bermuda-triad/ [ https://perma.cc/SLZ5-9CZ6 ];
see also Yan Cao, How Betsy DeVos Got Schooled by the Education Corporation of America, CENTURY
FOUND. (Dec. 14, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/betsy-devos-got-schooled-educationcorporation-america/ [ https://perma.cc/Q5VZ-27TR ] (“Last week, Education Corporation of
America (ECA), a for-profit college conglomerate that has operated chains like Virginia College,
Brightwood, and Golf Academy, hastily announced the sudden closure of campuses nationwide.
Estimates suggest that nearly 20,000 students across the United States will be impacted.”); Matthew
Bruckner, Enron & ITT Tech, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 8, 2016), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2016/09/enron-itt-tech.html [ https://perma.cc/H8Q3-LXPP ]; Matthew Bruckner,
Who’s Looking Out for the Students?, CREDIT SLIPS ( Jan. 20, 2015, 8:49 PM), https://
www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2015/01/whos-looking-out-for-the-students.html
[ https://
perma.cc/2UY6-ZMRP ].
15. DAVID A. TANDBERG, ELLIE M. BRUECKER & DUSTIN D. WEEDEN, STATE HIGHER
EDUC. EXEC. OFFICERS ASS’N, IMPROVING STATE AUTHORIZATION: THE STATE ROLE IN
ENSURING QUALITY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2019), https://
sheeo.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/SHEEO_StateAuth.pdf [ https://perma.cc/PP88-CLCM ]
(“A renewed level of interest in and scrutiny of public accountability of higher education has recently
been fueled by a wave of institutional closures . . . .”).
16. See infra Part I.
17. “While much of the attention has focused on the role of accreditors and the federal
government, the central actors in the higher education public accountability space are the states.”
TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4.
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are harmed when they pay for an education that does not increase their earning
power sufficiently to pay off their student loan debt. Part II discusses the existing
regulatory framework, including why neither ED nor accreditors seem capable of
ensuring that students receive an economic return on their higher education
expenditures,18 or even simply protecting all students from exploitation.
Finally, Part III looks at a range of options that interested states could adopt
to prevent IHEs from exploiting state residents. These options are based on
programs that ED has previously used and include the gainful employment rule and
a cohort default rate metric to ensure that students get a financial19 return on their
higher education expenditures. And it also includes better information gathering
tools to create financial responsibility scores for colleges to better anticipate (and
hopefully prevent) college collapses and the concomitant student harm. This part
also considers how states could encourage IHEs to report data and comply with
state regulation, including limiting state authorization or accessing additional
funding. A conclusion follows.
I. STUDENT HARM
“[A]s more students have had to borrow, and borrow more, to even attempt a degree or
credential program, some are ending up even worse off than before they started, with thousands
of dollars of debt and little or no increased earnings power to pay it off.”20
Whether or not a student attends an IHE that closes precipitously, students
are hurt when they borrow heavily to attend an institution that does not sufficiently
boost their earning power to repay their educational debt.21 And alumni of hundreds
18. The author believes that higher education is a quasi-public good justifying larger public
investment and is not simply a private good. Increasingly, however, elected officials appear to disagree,
and individuals have been asked to shoulder a larger portion of the cost of higher education. It is within
this latter paradigm that this Article was written.
19. While there are surely other important returns to students (and society) from investments
in higher education, there must also be some point at which we, collectively, are willing to describe an
IHE as acting in its own best interests instead of the best interests of its students. In my opinion, such
schools should not be permitted to operate. At a minimum, such schools should not be supported with
taxpayer funds.
20. NEHA DALAL, BETH STEIN & JESSICA THOMPSON, THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS
& SUCCESS, OF METRICS AND MARKETS: MEASURING POST-COLLEGE EMPLOYMENT SUCCESS 4
(2018), https://ticas.org/files/pub_files/of_metrics_markets.pdf [ https://perma.cc/UX9Z-SU5C ].
21. See Patrick F. Linehan, Dreams Protected: A New Approach to Policing Proprietary Schools’
Misrepresentations, 89 GEO. L.J. 753, 754 (2001) (describing the plight of several students defrauded by
predatory colleges that offered no-value “educations” and claiming that these stories are “typical of
many individuals, often of low socioeconomic and educational status, who attempt to improve their
labor skills by enrolling in vocational training schools”); see also Michael Itzkowitz, Price-to-Earnings
Premium: A New Way of Measuring Return on Investment in Higher Ed, THIRD WAY (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://www.thirdway.org/report/price-to-earnings-premium-a-new-way-of-measuring-return-oninvestment-in-higher-ed [ https://perma.cc/9R2X-2HZL ] (discussing interest from some
Congresspersons in developing “policies that would protect students from poor-performing colleges
and programs”); TRESSIE MCMILLAN COTTOM, LOWER ED: THE TROUBLING RISE OF FOR-PROFIT
COLLEGES IN THE NEW ECONOMY 67 (THE NEW PRESS 2017) (“As it turns out, there is such a thing
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of colleges leave school making “well below the average earnings of a worker with
only a high school diploma.”22 In some cases, alumni fare poorly because the
schools are outright frauds.23 Among others, ITT Tech and its executives were
credibly accused of fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) at the time it closed in 2016.24
Even when a school is not defrauding students outright, students may attend
well-meaning but low-value institutions that fail to adequately prepare students for
the job market.25 At these IHEs, students may not learn important skills. For
example, many students show no “significant improvement in critical thinking,
complex reasoning, and written communication skills after four years of college
coursework.”26 Several commentators have suggested that “[a] significant chunk of
our higher-education system, perhaps as much as thirty or forty percent, does not
graduate students into jobs with high enough salaries to justify the cost of providing
the education.”27 And some schools may simply lack the resources, ability, or
interest to adequate support all of their students.28

as ‘bad’ education. It is an educational option that, by design, cannot increase students’ odds of beating
the circumstances of their birth.”).
22. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 5; see also Michael Itzkowitz, Higher Ed’s Broken
Bridge to the Middle Class, THIRD WAY (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.thirdway.org/report/higher-edsbroken-bridge-to-the-middle-class [ https://perma.cc/XEL2-LDB3 ] (“When measuring
post-enrollment earnings six years after enrollment, there are 257—or 6.5% of all institutions with
earnings data available—where over four-fifths of the student body fails to earn as much as the average
high school graduate. And there are a whopping 2,075 institutions (52% of all institutions) where over
half of students who enroll are earning less than a high school graduate six years later.”).
23. See Linehan, supra note 21, at 759 (discussing various misrepresentations that proprietary
schools may make to students, including “students’ prospects for employment upon graduation,” and
the reasons why those schools make such misrepresentations).
24. See Yan Cao & Tariq Habash, College Complaints Unmasked, CENTURY FOUND. (Nov. 8,
2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/college-complaints-unmasked/ [ https://perma.cc/VRW5QT4W ] (“By the time ITT closed in September 2016, it was under investigation by multiple state
attorneys general offices; the Securities and Exchange Commission, which oversees Wall Street, had
charged its executives with fraud; and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) had
uncovered ‘secret shopper’ evidence showing that ITT recruiters regularly lied to potential students.”).
25. See MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 5 (“[T]he U.S. also hosts thousands of
poor- and under-performing colleges, where millions of students are paying—and often borrowing—a
lot.”); see also Linehan, supra note 21, at 759; Preston Cooper, Taxpayers Fund College Degrees that Don’t
Pay Off, FORBES ( Jan. 21, 2020, 2:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/prestoncooper2/2020/01/
21/taxpayers-fund-college-degrees-that-dont-pay-off/ [ https://perma.cc/3JN7-MDND ].
26. ANDREW P. KELLY & DANIEL K. LAUTZENHEISER, TAKING CHARGE: A STATE-LEVEL
AGENDA FOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM 2 (2013), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/07/-taking-charge_103835525600.pdf [ https://perma.cc/ZK3Z-G523 ].
27. Cooper, supra note 25; see MELANIE DELGADO, CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST., FAILING U 2
(2018) (“[F]or-profit colleges of all sizes are over-promising and under-delivering when it comes to the
quality of their academic programs and offerings, as well as the ability of their graduates to cash in on
lucrative careers.”); DALAL ET AL., supra note 20.
28.
See generally MCMILLAN COTTOM, supra note 21 (discussing the financialization of the
for-profit higher education sector and suggesting that, at some IHEs, maximizing enrollment to satisfy
shareholder demands is more important than providing “good” educations for students).
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Students who borrow money but never graduate are particularly likely to be
harmed by that borrowing.29 Unfortunately, these harms disproportionately befall
minority student loan borrowers.30 Even for students who graduate, default rates
on student loan debts are much higher for minority borrowers than for white
borrowers.31 Twelve years after first taking out a student loan, forty-nine percent of
Black borrowers (including twenty-three percent of bachelor’s degree attainers)
have defaulted on their loans and thirty-six percent of Hispanic borrowers
(including fourteen percent of bachelor’s degree attainers) have defaulted on their
loans, whereas only twenty-one percent of white borrowers (including just six
percent of bachelor’s degree attainers) have defaulted.32
For some, higher education offers a pathway to the middle class.33 But
students who attend exploitative or low-quality IHEs34 are harmed twice over. First,
they waste their time.35 Second, they waste their money.36 And a lot of borrowed

29. See Katherine Porter, College Lessons: The Financial Risks of Dropping Out, in BROKE: HOW
DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 85–100 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (explaining that incurring
educational debt without earning a degree can lead to bankruptcy). See generally KELLY
& LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 1 (“Across two and four-year institutions, just half of students
who start a degree finish it within six years.”).
30. See KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 1; Ben Miller, New Federal Data Show a
Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 16, 2007, 9:00 AM)
[ hereinafter Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers ],
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/10/16/440711/
new-federal-data-show-student-loan-crisis-african-american-borrowers/ [ https://perma.cc/D4NPB5R6 ]; see also Ben Miller, The Continued Student Loan Crisis for Black Borrowers, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 2, 2019, 5:00 AM) [ hereinafter Miller, The Continued Student Loan Crisis for Black
Borrowers ], https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/2019/12/
02/477929/continued-student-loan-crisis-black-borrowers/ [ https://perma.cc/FX88-5TJK ]; Dalié
Jiménez & Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt Is a Civil Rights Issue: The Case for Debt Relief and Higher
Education Reform, 55 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 131 (2020).
31. Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers, supra
note 30; Miller, The Continued Student Loan Crisis for Black Borrowers, supra note 30; Jiménez & Glater
supra note 30.
32. Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers, supra
note 30.
33. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, The Investment Imperative, 57 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2019)
(“One major aim of higher education legislation has been to increase access to bolster individual and
societal advancement.”); see also THEA GARON, ANDREW DUNN, KATY GOLVALA & ERIC WILSON,
FIN. HEALTH NETWORK, U.S. FINANCIAL HEALTH PULSE: 2018 BASELINE SURVEY RESULTS 38
(2018),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-files-2018/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/
07151007/FHN-Pulse_Baseline_SurveyResults-web.pdf [ https://perma.cc/53J5-CLU2 ] (noting the
correlation between financial health and educational attainment).
34. Or who attend high-quality IHEs but receive a low-value education.
35. “Thousands of students, many of them veterans, invested substantial amounts of time and
money into pursuing degrees they never received; many of those students were left with enormous
amounts of student loan debt, which cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.” See DELGADO, supra note
27, at 1.
36. KRISTIN BLAGG & KELIA WASHINGTON, URB. INST., WHICH DOLLARS GET MEASURED?
ASSESSING EARNINGS METRICS USING DATA FROM CONNECTICUT 1 (2020), https://
www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101637/which_dollars_get_measured_0_4.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/RM5N-HK5Q ] (“Similarly, when prospective students are considering where to
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money is being wasted.37 Federal and state governments have engaged in a
decades-long effort to increase enrollment at IHEs by making available large sums
of money for students to borrow.38 Student aid, in the form of state and federal
loans and grants, and, more recently, “free college” programs in various states, costs
the federal and state governments more than $150 billion per year.39 By many
estimates, total student indebtedness now exceeds $1.6 trillion.40 Even more
troubling, student indebtedness is growing fast.41
Moreover, a generation of heavily indebted students may be a problem for
America as a whole, not just for the indebted students. Increasingly, people have
begun to liken the student loan crisis to the subprime mortgage crisis.42 Students

invest their eligible financial aid, their own money, and their time, they are also calculating whether the
return on their investment will be greater than the monetary and nonmonetary costs.”).
37. Most of the money that students use to pay for their education is borrowed. See Cooper,
supra note 25 (arguing that low-quality schools should not have access to taxpayer-supported loans and
grants); cf. BETH AKERS, MANHATTAN INST., RISK SHARING: HOW TO HOLD COLLEGES
ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE EDUCATION THEY PROVIDE 4 (2019), https://media4.manhattaninstitute.org/sites/default/files/Risk-Sharing-How-to%20Hold-Colleges-Accountable-BA.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/9M9E-NBT5 ] (“The federal government is the single largest purchaser of
postsecondary education services in the United States.”).
38. See Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 4, at 250–51 (“Federal efforts to promote college access
through Title IV have not been cheap. The federal government indirectly provides an enormous amount
of money to IHEs, including more than $76 billion in 2013, representing a slight majority of all student
aid. Federal student aid takes a variety of forms, including well-known programs such as Pell Grants,
Perkins, Grad (PLUS), and Stafford Loans. Total student loan indebtedness now tops one trillion
dollars, almost all of it backed by federal government guarantees.”); see also Christopher J. Ryan, Jr.,
Paying for Law School: Law Student Loan Indebtedness and Career Choices, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (“The current outstanding student loan debt is roughly $1.64 trillion dollars and continues to
grow every year.”) (citing Chris Arnold, Student Loans a Lot like the Mortgage Debacle, Says Watchdog,
NPR (Dec. 9, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/09/785527874/student-loans-a-lotlike-the-subprime-mortgage-debacle-watchdog-says [ https://perma.cc/JX8J-3RHY ] and Anya
Kamanetz, Democratic Presidential Contenders Propose Free College and Student Loan Forgiveness, NPR
( June 27, 2019, 10:41 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/27/736342686/democratic-presidentialcontenders-propose-free-college-and-student-loan-forgive [ https://perma.cc/963F-PSWJ ]); Elengold,
supra note 33, at 4.
39. See Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 4, at 250.
40. See Ed Flynn, Game of Loans: Is Student Debt Forgiveness Coming?, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12
(2019) (noting that “[t]he St. Louis Federal Reserve, which gets information from lenders, reports that
total student loan debt was $1.61 trillion as of June 30, 2019”).
41. Abigail Hess, Here’s How Much the Average Student Loan Borrower Owes when They Graduate,
CNBC MAKE IT (Feb. 15, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/15/heres-how-muchthe-average-student-loan-borrower-owes-when-they-graduate.html [ https://perma.cc/4TCJ-RVXC ]
(“When they graduate, the average student loan borrower has $37,172 in student loans, a $20,000
increase from 13 years ago.”); see also Ryan, Jr., supra note 38, at 4 n.9 (quoting Matthew P. Diehr, The
Looming Threat Posed to Student Loan Lenders and Servicers by State-Level Actors in an Era of Federal
Regulatory Remission, 65 FED. LAW. 43, 43 (2018)).
42. Amir Shachmurove, David M. Gettings, Stephen C. Piepgrass, Timothy St. George & Alan
Wingfield, Federal Inaction and State Activity: Student Loan Edition, LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2018, 1:12 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1066268/federal-inaction-and-state-activity-student-loan-edition
[ https://perma.cc/CJ97-N8RK ] (“By 2017, student loan data shows patterns that are similar to what
occurred prior to the subprime mortgage crisis.”); Prentiss Cox, Judith L. Fox & Stacey Tutt, Forgotten
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are borrowing heavily and struggling to repay their debt. Many cannot. These
students either end up in default or in some sort of loan forgiveness program.43
“More than one million students default on almost $20 billion worth of federal
student loans each year.”44 Many more are substantially past due on their
payments.45 “As of August 2018, 11 million of the roughly 44.2 million borrowers
are in a state of default or delinquency.”46 “When discussing student loan debt, it is
easy to fixate on the aggregate impact of the burdens this debt places on tax payers,
the economy, and borrowers alike, such as the depressive effects that [student] loan
debt has on marriage, homeownership, and entrepreneurship.”47
While return on investment and student indebtedness are not the only
measures of whether an IHE is a low-value or low-quality institution (let alone
exploitative), these issues are hard to ignore because of our extant higher education
financing system.48 For so long as most students are effectively required to
debt-fund their educations,49 students’ return on investment will remain an
important criteria on which to judge whether IHEs are providing a service on which
the federal and state governments should offer their imprimatur.50 Focusing on

Borrowers: Protecting Private Student Loan Borrowers Through State Law, 11 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 43 (2020) (comparing the student loan crisis to the mortgage foreclosure crisis).
43. Ryan, Jr., supra note 38, at 4 n.9; Joy Wiltermuth, A Record One-Quarter of $450 Billion of
Student Loans Are Being Repaid on Income-Based Repayment Plans, DBRS, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 24,
2020, 11:08 AM), https://marketwatch.com/story/a-record-one-quarter-of-450-billion-of-studentloans-are-being-repaid-on-income-based-repayment-plans-dbrs-2020-02-22 [ https://perma.cc/
6GMH-VWRN ] (“Income-based repayment plans were being used on 24.7% of $452 billion worth of
student loans with U.S. government backing during the fourth-quarter of 2019, up from 21.8% a year
earlier . . . .”).
44. Matthew Bruckner, Brook Gotberg, Dalié Jiménez & Chrystin Ondersma, A No-Contest
Discharge for Uncollectible Student Loans, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 183, 189 (2020) [hereinafter Bruckner et
al., No-Contest].
45. Shachmurove et al., supra note 42 (“In fact, per one of the most exhaustive recent studies,
almost 40 percent of student loan borrowers are either in default or more than 90 days past due on
their payments as of October 2017. The DOE, for its part, has reported that more than 8 million federal
student loan borrowers are in default and have not made a payment in at least a year and another three
million direct loan borrowers—those with debt from the largest federal student loan program—are
delinquent on their loans and have not made a payment in more than 30 days in 2017.”).
46. Ryan, Jr., supra note 38, at 4 n.9; Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt Statistics in 2018: A
$1.5 Trillion Crisis, FORBES ( June 13, 2018, 8:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/
2018/06/13/student-loan-debt-statistics-2018 [ https://perma.cc/4ULR-LB7D ].
47. Ryan, Jr., supra note 38, at 2 (discussing law school-related student loan debt).
48. See Itzkowitz, supra note 22 (noting that students cannot easily comparison shop for high
“value” IHEs and discussing students’ need “to easily assess how long it will take to recoup their
educational investment—or to compare those timelines across schools or programs”).
49. See Hess, supra note 41; Elengold, supra note 33, at 47–48 (discussing how the “investment
imperative risks overpromising students certain financial outcomes from seeking a college certification
or degree, encouraging overconfidence in the ability to repay education debt” and causing a “student
debt cascade”); Ryan, Jr., supra note 38, at 4.
50. Alternative methods of financing higher education and arguments that higher education is
a public good are outside the scope of this Article. For more about whether we should conceive of
higher education as a public good, see Gareth Williams, Higher Education: Public Good or Private
Commodity?, 14 LONDON REV. EDUC. 131 (2016).
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student outcomes can also allow state higher education regulators to become more
actively involved with troubled institutions sooner. Too often, state attorneys
general are the ones who first step in but only after there has already “been
substantial harm to students and to taxpayers.”51
The next part explores the existing regulatory framework, including a succinct
explanation of the role of each regulator. It also explains why the existing regulatory
framework does not provide adequate oversight of IHEs.
II. THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IS INADEQUATE
“[F]ar too many schools maintain their institutional accreditation even while defrauding
and misleading students, providing poor quality education, or closing without recourse
for students.”52
The question that motivates this Article is as follows: How can we create the
necessary “accountability . . . to ensure students are not left to bear unaffordable
debt,” particularly student loan debt incurred while attending low-value or
exploitative IHEs?53 One place to begin our inquiry is with the entities responsible
for ensuring IHEs provide affordable high-quality educations rather than prey on
vulnerable students. These entities are known as the “program integrity triad.”54 The
triad—our existing higher education regulatory apparatus—is composed of ED,
accrediting agencies, and states.55 Figure 1 highlights the interplay between members
of the triad.56
Figure 1: Program Integrity Triad

51. DELGADO, supra note 27, at 2.
52. Ted Mitchell, Strengthening Accreditation to Protect Students, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC.: HOMEROOM (Mar. 29, 2016), https://blog.ed.gov/2016/03/strengthening-accreditation-toprotect-students/ [ https://perma.cc/L4JR-LN25 ].
53. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 35; cf. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4.
54. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 8. This Article is not going to address ex post
enforcement through litigation, including tort, contract, or consumer law theories of recovery.
55. Id. at 5–6.
56. Figure 1 copied from MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 6.
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“This distributed approach to higher education accountability is designed to keep
governmental intrusion in higher education to a minimum and maintain a proper
division of powers between the states, the institutions and the
federal government.”57
The triad needs to be reinvigorated. This regulatory framework predates the
introduction and growth of federal aid programs, which have changed institutional
behavior as entities chase this massive infusion of federal money.58 And it “provides
little or no assurance that schools are educating students efficiently and
effectively.”59 Perhaps as a result, McCann & Laitinen describe our current
framework as the “‘Bermuda triad,’ with the mysterious disappearance of rigorous
oversight of colleges that are known by all actors to be problems.”60 In some ways,
the triad appears to have parallels to bank regulation prior to the 2008 financial
crisis. Both regulatory schemes attempted to create a collaborative state-federal
partnership, and both resulted in a regulatory lacuna, with no single entity having
the authority and interest in adequately overseeing its charges.
The roles of each member of the triad are discussed in the three sections that
follow, including why they are not able to effectively police institutional quality.
A. The U.S. Department of Education
ED is the most prominent member of the triad.61 ED “certifies institutions to
be eligible for taxpayer-financed financial aid and oversees their administration of
those funds.”62 Put differently, ED supplies a large percentage of all the funding
received by American IHEs. In addition, ED also regulates which accrediting
agencies “bear responsibility for the academic quality of the colleges they
57. THOMAS HARNISCH, BARMAK NASSIRIAN, AMBER SADDLER & ART COLEMAN,
EDUC. COMM’N STATES, ENHANCING STATE AUTHORIZATION: THE NEED FOR ACTION BY STATES
AS STEWARDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION PERFORMANCE 2 (2016), http://www.ecs.org/wp-content/
uploads/ECS_FundingReports_HarnischNassirianSaddlerColeman_F.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/
G97F-S2XF ].
58. Id. at 9 (“In sum, the original decision to rely on the regulatory framework that pre-dated
the introduction and growth of federal aid programs did not anticipate how the massive infusion of
federal money would change the behavior of both regulators and regulated entities as the breadth of
institutions and providers of higher education expanded.”); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 7
(“[R]apid growth in the number of proprietary institutions in the 1980s resulted in a greater need for
state oversight and more applications for state authorizers, but the rigor of these processes remained
fractured across different states.”).
59. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 6; Linehan, supra note 21 (“[E]xisting state law,
either through public or private enforcement, does not provide proprietary schools with adequate
incentives to implement honest, non-predatory marketing techniques, nor does it provide victimized
students with adequate remedies when schools do employ these dishonest, predatory techniques.”).
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 5–6 (“[A]ccrediting agencies are approved by the Education Department to bear
responsibility for the academic quality of the colleges they accredit; the states are tasked with consumer
protection; and the federal government, via the U.S. Department of Education, certifies institutions to
be eligible for taxpayer-financed financial aid and oversees their administration of those funds. The
Department also decides which accreditors meet federal standards.”).
62. Id.
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accredit.”63 And it has also dictated certain requirements for state authorization of
Title IV-eligible IHEs.64
Given its control over the purse strings, ED could be “the strongest regulator
in the triad,” with the ability to ensure that “baseline consumer protection exists for
all students.”65 And many have pushed ED to assume a more robust role by, for
example, “serv[ing] as the convener and the facilitator for a sustained conversation”
on how states could strengthen their “authorization standards and improv[e] the[ir]
administrative and organizational processes.”66 But the Department’s current
leadership has not shown itself willing to step up in these ways.
While many criticized ED even before the start of the Trump administration,
“[b]eginning in 2016, a new mood dampened the federal bureaucracy’s regulatory
pace.”67 At this point, many believe that ED basically “abdicated its responsibility”
to students and taxpayers by “back-tracking on what few protections do exist in the
program integrity triad.”68 For example, ED repealed the Obama-era gainful
employment rule,69 undefining the term “without replacing it with some new
meaning.”70 ED has also been criticized for failing to properly oversee accrediting
agencies.71 Secretary DeVos has also been held in contempt of court by a federal

63. Id. at 6 (“The Department also decides which accreditors meet federal standards.”); see also
LINDSEY M. BURKE & STUART M. BUTLER, HERITAGE FOUND., ACCREDITATION: REMOVING THE
BARRIER TO HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM 6 (2012), https://www.heritage.org/education/report/
accreditation-removing-the-barrier-higher-education-reform [ https://perma.cc/MKY8-MV3K ] (“In
order to be recognized as an approved accreditor, a prospective accrediting agency must complete a
grueling review process overseen by DOE and the National Advisory Committee.”).
64. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 8.
65. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 27. ED is only the strongest if you consider the
market to be national. But, particularly since ED has stepped back its enforcement, state agencies are
the strongest regulator in the triad in some states.
66. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57 at 10.
67. Shachmurove et al., supra note 42 (explaining that ED, led by Secretary DeVos has
“displayed decreased enthusiasm for regulation and litigation,” as has the CFPB under both of its
Trump-appointed directors); MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 8 (“[C]hange is
desperately needed.”).
68. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 8.
69. For a discussion of the gainful employment rule, see infra Section III.A.1.
70. See Corey Turner, Teachers Union Lawsuit Claims DeVos ‘Capriciously’ Repealed Borrower
Protections, NPR ( Jan. 22, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/22/798128256/teachersunion-lawsuit-claims-devos-capriciously-repealed-borrower-protections [ https://perma.cc/9E8DT9JN ] (“‘They just undefined the term,’ says James Kvaal, who helped design the original rule as deputy
undersecretary in the Obama Education Department. ‘Gainful employment had meaning, and [DeVos]
took it out. And I just — I’ve never seen that before. I’ve never seen an agency take a term that was in
the regulations and just undefine it . . . .’”); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 96–97,
Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. DeVos, No. 5:20-cv-00455 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2020) (asserting that ED acted
“arbitrarily, capriciously, and not in accordance with law” when it repealed the gainful
employment rule).
71. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 14 (arguing that ED “does not have adequate
controls” over the decision to recognize accreditors, and that ED’s oversight of accreditors once they’re
recognized “is not adequate to ensure agencies consistently and effectively carry out their
responsibilities”); id. at 15 (asserting that ED “has virtually no ability to police which accreditors are
permitted to serve as gatekeepers to billions in federal dollars”).
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judge “for failing to stop collecting loans from former students of a now-defunct
chain of for-profit colleges.”72
ED’s failure as a regulator of institutional quality seems primarily political in
nature. Thus, with a new administration, ED might play a more prominent role in
protecting students. And it should. The federal government has “a stake
in . . . improv[ing] institutional accountability and consumer protection.”73 While
states can play an important role, ED’s involvement may be critical to moving the
ball forward because this effort “would require significant resources and an upfront
investment of time and effort” to generate the necessarily “collaborative national
effort.”74 Until there is a leadership change at ED, however, students will have to
look elsewhere for an entity willing to protect their interests.
B. Accrediting Agencies
Accreditors are the second leg of the regulatory triad for IHEs and,
traditionally, have been considered the primary IHE-quality regulator.75 Technically,
accreditation is voluntary and there are many IHEs that are unaccredited.
Unaccredited entities tend to be either new institutions that are not yet accredited,
institutions that have lost their accreditation and are on their way to closing down,
or institutions that do not intend to participate in the Title IV programs. However,
almost all traditional two- and four-year colleges and universities are accredited by
a regional or national accrediting agency.76 This is because accreditation is required
of IHEs that wish to participate in the federal student loan and grant programs
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA).77 Thus, accreditation is
effectively mandatory for most traditional two- and four-year colleges
and universities.78

72. Elissa Nadworny & Anya Kamanetz, DeVos Held in Contempt of Court for Enforcing Loans
on Defrauded College Students, NPR (Oct. 25, 2019, 10:29 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/25/
773334681/devos-held-in-contempt-of-court-ed-department-fined-100-000-in-student-loan-case
[ https://perma.cc/WPE8-3SX4 ].
73. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 10.
74. Id.
75. “[A]ccreditors served as the primary gatekeepers – and scapegoats – in evaluating
institutions of higher education.” TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 7; see also MCCANN & LAITINEN,
supra note 14, at 5; BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 63, at 5 (“[B]ecause the institution is accredited,
students can be confident that the university is operated professionally and that the courses they take
will be of an appropriate standard.”). But see DELGADO, supra note 27, at 10 (arguing that “[a]ccreditation
is not a sufficient substitute for rigorous state oversight”).
76. BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 63, at 7 (“Most traditional four-year colleges and universities
are . . . accredited by one of the six regional accrediting agencies. By contrast, most for-profit and
technical schools are accredited by national accrediting agencies.”).
77. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 63, at 5.
78. See id. “Once a voluntary decision on the part of universities, accreditation is now a de
facto requirement for institutions to be eligible even to open their doors or for their students to receive
federal aid.” Id. at 8; see 1 JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 3.08[4][a] (2020) (“[A]s a practical matter,
accreditation has become a necessity for post-secondary institutions for several fundamental reasons.”);
see also Matthew Adam Bruckner, Bankrupting Higher Education, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697, 698 (2017)

First to Printer_Bruckner_BB Edits.docx (Do Not Delete)

14

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/26/20 1:49 PM

[Vol. 11:1

The primary role of accreditors in the triad is to ensure that the “institution
meets certain standards of quality.”79 This role is mandated by federal law, which
requires accrediting bodies to “develop standards in areas that tend to indicate
school success, such as graduation and placement rates, loan default rates, curricula
and faculty, student support services, facilities and equipment, program length, and
recruiting and admissions practices.”80 Notably, this seemingly requires accreditors
to consider both inputs (e.g., facilities) and outputs (e.g., graduation rates).
Despite accreditors’ role as the academic quality-regulator,81 some believe that
accreditors “lack effective oversight practices . . . .”82 These criticisms often center
on the nature of an accreditor’s review, which “largely measure ‘quality’ in terms of
inputs . . . [which are] dubious measures of an institution’s capacity.”83 A rigorous
review of an IHE’s quality requires a focus on student outcomes, not “faculty
credentials, facilities, and even the number of books in the library,” especially
for reauthorization.84
Unfortunately, accrediting agencies are unlikely to adequately protect students
by serving as a capable steward of higher education quality. As a group, accrediting
agencies are primarily “interested in institutional improvement and inclined against
institutional sanctioning.”85 Yet they have been conscripted into “a high-stakes role
[ hereinafter Bruckner, B a n k r u p t i n g H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n ] (referring to the loss of Title IV funds as
“an effective death sentence” for IHEs).
79. See supra text accompanying note 65; see also Mary Watson Smith & Joshua C. Hall, Keeping
College Pricey: The Bootlegger and Baptist Story of Higher Education Accreditation, 44 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 33 (2019); RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[1] (“Accreditation involves a determination by an
accrediting agency that an educational institution meets certain established standards.”).
80. Linehan, supra note 21, at 783.
81. See Pro. Massage Training Ctr., Inc. v. Accreditation All. of Career Schs. & Colls.,
No. 1-12-cv-911, 2014 WL 201879, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 2014) (describing accreditation as the
“process which vets the schools and designates those which are accredited as having exceeded a certain
threshold of quality and competency”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 781 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2015).
82. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 14–15 (claiming that “inadequate accreditors’
standards are a challenge for overseeing academic quality and that accreditors lack effective oversight
practices for academic quality” and that “accreditors have fallen short of their responsibilities”); BURKE
& BUTLER, supra note 63, at 8 (“Even though it is a de facto requirement for colleges, accreditation does
not guarantee academic quality.”); RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[1] (“[A]ccreditation . . . is subject to some
deserved criticism.”); DELGADO, supra note 27, at 6 (“[E]ven though regional accreditors tend to have
more stringent standards and more diversity of membership, they, like national accreditors, tend to lack
effective review of consumer protection issues.”).
83. Smith & Hall, supra note 79, at 41, 43; see also AKERS, supra note 37, at 4 (“The current system
of oversight for colleges in the U.S. is implicitly based on the notion that the quality of education can
and should be measured by examining the ‘inputs’ rather than the ‘outputs.’”).
84. Andrew P. Kelly, At Last! Promising Higher Ed Ideas from Washington, AM. ENTER. INST.
(Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.aei.org/articles/at-last-promising-higher-ed-ideas-from-washington/
[ https://perma.cc/3LR8-DA9Y ].
85. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 11, 15 (explaining that accreditors “withdrew
accreditation for only about 1 percent of accredited schools, despite there being more than 1,500
accredited colleges with graduation rates below 40 percent.”); see also RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[3]
(“Accreditation is a voluntary, generally nongovernmental system, peer review process for recognizing
educational institutions for a level of performance, integrity, and quality that entitles them to the
confidence of the educational community and the public they serve.”).
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as . . . gatekeepers to more than $120 billion in federal dollars annually, most of
which is borrowed by—and must be repaid by—students.”86 This is a function
accrediting agencies are ill-suited to fulfill.87
Because of accreditors’ predilection toward institutional improvement and
against sanctions, “schools failing to meet accreditors’ standards could easily go a
decade before they lose accreditation.”88 The high-stakes nature of an institution
losing accreditation makes accreditors “reluctant to use that bludgeon.”89 Without
more graduated penalties, such as enrollment limitations, accreditors will always be
slow to withdraw accreditation from even the most troubling institutions. For
example, when Corinthian Colleges collapsed in 2014, it was in good standing with
its accreditor, the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools.90
Corinthian remained fully accredited despite not having the financial wherewithal
to withstand even a short interruption to its cash flow and despite investigations by
ED and multiple attorneys general for, among other things, defrauding students by
publishing misleading job placement rates.91 Yet both ED and states have continued
to rely on accreditors as the stewards of higher education quality.
C. States
Providing an education for residents is a core function of state and local
governments.92 No surprise then that states are the third member of the triad and
86. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 11; Smith & Hall, supra note 79, at 34 (arguing that
in short, they are the “gatekeepers of these federal monies.”); see also Kelly, supra note 84 (explaining
that the federal government provides “access to more than $150 billion in student financial aid” each
year but largely allows “third-party accreditation agencies that are closely allied with existing higher
education institutions” to decide which entities are eligible to receive these funds).
87. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 13 (arguing that this role is a strange fit for them
because “accreditors do not see themselves as regulators.”); Linehan, supra note 21, at 780 (“[T]he
U.S. Senate reported in 1991, ‘[a]ccrediting agencies reject the idea that it is their responsibility to see
that Title IV funds are administered properly at their schools.’”) (citing S. REP. NO. 102-58, at 17–18
(1991)). Even worse, some suggest “that the current system of higher education accreditation acts as a
cartel aimed at keeping the price of a college education high, with few incentives for anything beyond
minimum quality standards.” BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 63, at 8 (“With regard to colleges and
universities, accreditation has become, first and foremost, a barrier to entry.”); see also Zachary Maggio,
State Policy and For-Profit Higher Education: A Comparative Case Study of Two States 174 (2018)
(Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (arguing that some accreditors “engage in a tacit kind of
‘quid pro quo’ approach that errs on the side of ‘rubber-stamping’ applications that come before it”
because the accreditor “is not well empowered to engage in rigorous oversight of
for-profit institutions”).
88. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 16.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 13.
91. Corinthian Colleges Student Loan Relief Eligibility, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. FOR D.C., https://
oag.dc.gov/corinthian-colleges-student-loan-relief [ https://perma.cc/QJH4-VSDD ] ( last visited
Sept. 23, 2020 ); Information for Former Corinthian Colleges Students, ST. CAL. DEP’T JUST.: XAVIER
BECERRA ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/corinthian [ https://perma.cc/YD9Z-YZLA ]
(Oct. 24, 2018).
92. RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[2] (“[T]he Supreme Court has stated that education is one of the
most important functions of state and local governments, and is, perhaps, at the very apex of the

First to Printer_Bruckner_BB Edits.docx (Do Not Delete)

16

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/26/20 1:49 PM

[Vol. 11:1

“have played a role in the oversight of public colleges within their borders since
the[ir] formation.”93 Thus, tradition dictates that states are primarily responsible for
authorizing and overseeing both public and private IHEs.94 In addition, ED has
“established minimum expectations for what qualifies as a college’s authorization
by a state.”95
States’ traditional role in the triad has been to “assure the legitimacy and
integrity of institutions of higher education”96 and to protect students from fraud
and abuse.97 States’ consumer protection role has a clear overlap with the role of
accreditors, but they have approached the role differently. Traditionally, states have
tried to protect students by creating “tuition recovery funds,” arranging to preserve
student records when IHEs close and ensuring that IHEs have “basic
operational safeguards.”98
Most states require that the IHE be authorized99 by a state agency before they
can operate.100 State regulatory agencies, such as California’s Bureau for Private

functions of a state.”) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972)); see also Matthew A. Bruckner, Special Purpose Municipal Entities and Bankruptcy: The
Case of Public Colleges, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 341, 365 (2020) (discussing a state’s obligation to
educate its residents).
93. MCCANN AND LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 19; TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 5 (“The
state’s preeminent role in higher education is appropriate because, under the reserved powers clause of
the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the provision of education is a responsibility of the
states.”); George Gollin, Emily Lawrence & Alan Contreras, Complexities in Legislative Suppression of
Diploma Mills, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 11 (2010) (“The state authorization requirement is in 34
C.F.R. § 600.4(a)(1), (3). These in turn are rooted in 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), which says that an
educational institution must be ‘legally authorized within each state to provide a program of education
beyond secondary education.’”); RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[2] (“By tradition and law, education is a
state function.”).
94. Maggio, supra note 87, at 3 (“[S]tate governments have a long-standing mandate of primary
authority and responsibility for higher education . . . .”); Linehan, supra note 21, at 785 (“[T]he
federalism concern that education policy be controlled at the state and local level.”); BRUCE
N. CHALOUX, STATE OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVATE AND PROPRIETARY SECTOR 4 (1985) (“[S]tates
traditionally have been legally responsible for authorizing educational activity within state boundaries.”).
95. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 8.
96. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 2.
97. Maggio, supra note 87, at 21; TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4.
98. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 11.
99. Some states use the term “authorization” to refer to “degree-granting activities and licensure
to nondegree-granting activities, although these distinctions are not universal.” CHALOUX, supra note
94, at 7–8.
100. It is the license from a state to an institution of higher education that “serves as the
fundamental formative act in the creation of postsecondary institutions and as the primary gatekeeper.”
HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 3; RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[3][a] (“Licensure generally refers to
the mechanism through which states grant individuals or, in some circumstances, organizations, the
authority to practice a restricted profession, such as operating an educational institution.”); see, e.g.,
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165A.330(l) (West 2018) (“No person shall conduct, operate, maintain, or
establish a proprietary school . . . unless he holds a valid current license from the commission.”);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 141.25(1) (West 2019) (“A private career school must not maintain, advertise,
solicit for, administer, or conduct any program in Minnesota without first obtaining a license from
the office.”).
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Postsecondary Education, are the primary state-based IHE regulators.101 States
authorize IHEs in a variety of ways, either via a state charter, by exempting IHEs
from the state authorization requirement (e.g., a religious exemption), or via
“authorization from the state for nonpublic institutions.”102 Some states embrace
their role in the triad with zeal.103 Others are more lax.104 For example, Reagan
National University—an accredited IHE that appeared to have no students, no
faculty, and no classrooms—operated out of South Dakota, which was described
as “the ideal place for Reagan” because “[t]he state has among the laxest rules for
colleges in the country.”105
In recent years, states have allowed other members of the triad to drive the
regulatory process, ceding “their role in the triad entirely to accreditors for the
purposes of federal student aid eligibility under the HEA, permitting institutions to
consider themselves authorized if they had obtained accreditation.”106 For example,
South Dakota authorizes any college that is accredited—“they don’t independently
hold universities accountable.”107 States have also deferred to the federal
government, allowing their responsibilities to police institutional quality to be
“subsumed in the nebulous architecture of the triad, which, in its ill-defined division
of responsibilities, may induce each actor to assume that critical functions are
someone else’s responsibility.”108 Finally, states have also deferred to each other
101. “States provide oversight in many ways, including through higher education regulatory
agencies, as well as through indirect means such as consumer protection and commerce laws.” Aaron
N. Taylor, Your Results May Vary: Protecting Students and Taxpayers Through Tighter Regulation of
Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 729, 768 (2010); see also About the Enforcement
Section, BUREAU FOR PRIV. POSTSECONDARY EDUC., https://www.bppe.ca.gov/enforcement/
about.shtml [https://perma.cc/NJA2-2JYQ] (last visited Sept. 23, 2020); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note
15, at 4 (“The foundational function of the state is the approval of an entity to establish itself as a
postsecondary institution. Most often referred to as state authorization, it is the first formal act in the
legal operation of an institution and often serves as the foundation upon which other quality assurance
functions are built (like accreditation).”).
102. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 3; see also MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 19
(“State authorization and oversight requirements also vary considerably from state to state.”).
103. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 3 (“Some states have proven to be active and thorough
in fulfilling this responsibility, while others have taken a passive approach with few requirements
demanded of institutions.”); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 7 (“[R]apid growth in the number of
proprietary institutions in the 1980s resulted in a greater need for state oversight and more applications
for state authorizers, but the rigor of these processes remained fractured across different states.”).
104. Id.
105. Chris Quintana & Shelly Conlon, This College Was Accredited by a DeVos-Sanctioned
Group. We Couldn’t Find Evidence of Students or Faculty., USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2020, 5:31 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2020/02/15/college-accreditation-departmenteducation-betsy-devos-south-dakota-sioux-falls/4746906002/ [ https://perma.cc/6LC4-MKSG ].
106. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 19; S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC.,
LAB. & PENSIONS, 112TH CONG., FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD
THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 10 (2012) (“[M]any States have taken a
passive or minimal role in approving institutions, reviewing and addressing complaints from students
and the public, and ensuring that colleges are in compliance with State consumer protection laws.”).
107. Quintana & Conlon, supra note 105.
108. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 4; see also DAVID A. TANDBERG & REBECCA
R. MARTIN, QUALITY ASSURANCE AND IMPROVEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE ROLE OF THE
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through their participation in reciprocity agreements.109 Unfortunately, in recent
years, states have become “the least consistent of the members of the program
integrity triad.”110
In the past, “states had to take full responsibility for the legitimacy, conduct
and impact of institutions they authorized.”111 States were more active participants,
in part, because “[s]tate authorization was the only public validation entities received
before claiming collegiate status.”112 And states could take a more active role once
more.113 For example, Tandberg, Bruecker, and Weeden wrote that states should
“reconsider and reconceptualize how they develop and implement a state
authorization process aimed at meeting the needs of its students as well as the
strategic goals of the state. This is particularly true given the proliferation of new
providers, distance education, alternative credentials, and new technologies.”114
States should pay attention to the “variety of general outcomes
measures—retention and graduation rates, placement and earnings data for
program graduates, loan default or repayment rates, to name a few examples—[that]

STATES 6 (2019) (“States play a fundamental role in higher education, protecting both the investment
of state dollars and their citizens as their consumers. Despite their central responsibility in this regard,
states have struggled with how they might help ensure that students are receiving a quality
educational experience.”).
109. See
About
NC-SARA,
NC-SARA,
https://www.nc-sara.org/about-nc-sara
[ https://perma.cc/F3MU-W5JU ] ( last visited Sept. 23, 2020 ).
110. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 22. Senator Harkin helped produce a report for
the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, which found that “[s]tate oversight of
for-profit education companies has eroded over time due to a variety of factors, including State budget
cuts and the influence of the for-profit college industry with State policymakers. The U.S. Department
of Education had never defined minimum requirements for State authorization, and many States have
taken a passive or minimal role in approving institutions, reviewing and addressing complaints from
students and the public, and ensuring that colleges are in compliance with State consumer protection
laws.” S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LAB. & PENSIONS, supra note 106, at 8.
111. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 4. But see TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 7 (“Prior
to the modern era, state higher education regulation had relatively little impact on postsecondary
institutions. Private institutions were largely seen as accountable because of their religious or
charitable affiliations.”).
112. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 4.
113. Linehan, supra note 21, at 785 (“Despite the expansive statutory regulatory scope of federal
oversight programs, the non-federal arms of the ‘triad’ fail to adequately play their part as gatekeepers
to Title IV funds.”); see TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108.
114. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4. To do so, NC-SARA may need to “be strengthened
to facilitate the provision of quality online educational opportunities across state lines while supporting
robust oversight structures to ensure consumer protection” because NC-SARA currently limits states’
authority over out-of-state distance education providers. Letter from Debbie Cochrane, Exec. Vice
President, The Inst. for Coll. Access & Success, Clare McCann, Deputy Dir. for Fed. Pol’y, New
Am. Higher Educ. Program, Bob Shireman, Senior Fellow, Century Found., Robyn Smith, Of Couns.,
Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr. & Carrie Wofford, President, Veterans Educ. Success, to Lori Williams,
President, Nat’l Council for State Authorization Reciprocity Agreements (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
ticas.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Comments-to-NC-SARA-Board-for-May-2020-Meeting.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/B5N4-ZG9C ]; see also Lindsay McKenzie, The Odd State Out, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-learning/article/2018/02/28/californiaholds-out-state-reciprocity-agreement-online [ https://perma.cc/XF9T-RH4B ].
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could serve as early warning signs of an institution failing to serve its students
well.”115 States are better situated than accreditors to police institutional quality
because state oversight “devolves decision-making power to leaders who are
well-equipped to recognize the specific needs of their local economies and
employers”116 because “state officials are politically accountable.”117 “[I]f the states
took seriously their role of authorizing institutions of higher education and ensuring
educational quality, state licensure could become an independent and meaningful
mark of quality for consumers, employers, and other graduate institutions.”118 This
would also make states, rather than accrediting agencies, the gatekeepers of
federal funds.119
The following part considers the tools available to triad members to police
higher education institutional quality, with an eye toward considering which of these
tools could be appropriated by state regulators interested in ensuring the
“operational legitimacy of institutions.”120

115. ANDREW P. KELLY, KEVIN J. JAMES & ROONEY COLUMBUS, INPUTS, OUTCOMES,
QUALITY ASSURANCE: A CLOSER LOOK AT STATE OVERSIGHT OF HIGHER EDUCATION 13 (2015).
But see TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 6 (“Definitions of quality in higher education are
varied and contested, while measuring quality may be an even more difficult task”). California is
currently the only state that could police out-of-state online schools in this way because every other
state is a member of NC-SARA, and participants in NC-SARA have agreed not to impose additional
“requirements on institutions from other SARA states.” About NC-SARA, supra note 109 (“As of
April 2020, 49 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are members
of SARA. Over 2,100 colleges and universities participate in SARA.”)
116. KELLY, supra note 84. But see Linehan, supra note 21, at 782 (“While the states have
relatively little to lose from student loan default resulting from proprietary schools’ predatory practices,
the federal government’s monetary interest in the Title IV program may drive more effective regulation
of proprietary school marketing and recruitment.”).
117. Smith & Hall, supra note 79, at 64 (“[V]oters’ demand for higher quality and lower cost
higher education could incentivize state officials to increase the supply by developing outcome-based
methods of assessing an institution’s performance and by encouraging low-cost and innovative new
educational programs. Because they are not publicly accountable—elected by traditional universities
institutionally opposed to innovation—the accreditors have no incentive to pursue such reforms.”); see
MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 23.
118. See Smith & Hall, supra note 79, at 62; HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 11 (“[S]tate
authorization should not be completely outsourced to accrediting agencies and the federal government.
Such a complete delegation of authority would essentially render state authorization meaningless and
non-additive.”).
119. Smith & Hall, supra note 79, at 62; see also Maggio, supra note 87, at 3 (“[S]tate governments
are arguably in the strongest position to enact effective regulation of the for-profit institutions operating
within their borders.”). But see TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 8 (pointing out that some
states lack an “operating definition of quality”).
120. Instead of relying on accreditors to do this work, which both the federal government and
the states have increasingly done. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 7.
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III. STATES AS STEWARDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION QUALITY
A. Solutions States Could Adopt
Most commentators that have considered how to strengthen the triad have
focused on either accreditors or ED.121 But this Article is intended to focus on how
states could provide greater consumer protections for in-state students.122 For too
long, states have deferred to other members of the triad instead of taking “the lead
in developing potential reforms or new regulatory mechanisms.”123 Some states
have “the capacity and appetite for greater institutional oversight responsibility held
by some actors within the state quality assurance ecosystem.”124 This Article is for
those state higher education regulators that are eager to do more. This part presents
a variety of regulatory solutions that states could adopt to better regulate in-state
institutions and out-of-state schools with brick-and-mortar campuses.125
It does so by drawing on various methods previously used by ED to police
institutional quality and prevent students from being exploited.126 Two
options—the gainful employment rule and cohort default rate metric—are directly
related to improving student outcomes. The other—the financial responsibility
scores—is about alerting students to possible school closures so that they may make
informed decisions about which institution to attend (or whether to transfer). States
could replicate and improve upon these methods. Each will be addressed in turn.
1. “Gainful Employment” Rule
In 2014, ED produced the “gainful employment rule—a regulation that holds
career training programs accountable if loan payments represent too large a share
121. See, e.g., Linehan, supra note 21, at 754 (“This Note argues that the U.S. Department of
Education is the superior entity to police proprietary schools.”); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15. But
see, e.g., HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57; MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14.
122. This is not, by far, the only article to consider the State’s role in consumer protection, but
it does appear to be the first law review article on the topic. Excellent coverage of this topic has been
provided by KELLY ET AL., supra note 115; TERESA E. TAYLOR, ART COLEMAN, BETHANY LITTLE
& AMBER SADDLER, EDUCATIONCOUNSEL, GETTING OUR HOUSE IN ORDER: CLARIFYING THE
ROLE OF THE STATES IN HIGHER EDUCATION QUALITY ASSURANCE (2016), http://
educationcounsel.com/?publication=getting-house-order-clarifying-role-state-higher-educationquality-assurance [ https://perma.cc/A3MM-7T3W ]; MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 22–25;
HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 6 (“The base of scholarly literature on the state authorization
function remains scant with two recent exceptions.”); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4 (“Given
the state’s interest in quality education and consumer protection, to what extent is its authorization
process advancing those goals, and what can be done to improve the authorization process to better
advance those goals?”); TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108.
123. Maggio, supra note 87, at 2.
124. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 9.
125. NC-SARA limits the ability of every state besides California to impose additional
regulatory requirements on out-of-state IHEs that operate entirely online. See About NC-SARA,
supra note 109.
126. Concerns about the exploitation of students underlies a lot of policies, including some
aspects of bankruptcy policy. See, e.g., Bruckner, Bankrupting Higher Education, supra note 78; Bruckner,
DNRs, supra note 4.
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of income for students who received federal aid and finished the program of
study.”127 The regulations were meant to “distinguish programs that provide
affordable training that leads to well-paying jobs from programs that leave students
with poor earnings prospects and high amounts of debt.”128 A program “passed”
the gainful employment test if it could satisfy two debt-to-earnings ratios: graduates
had to be able to repay their education debt by spending eight percent or less of
their annual income or twenty percent or less of their discretionary income.129 The
rule was also intended to force IHEs to disclose information to prospective students
about “what the typical graduate earns, how much debt graduates have, and what
share of graduates find employment in their field” to allow consumers to make
more informed decisions.130 Accordingly, a state version of the gainful employment
rule could be a useful tool to protect students from programs that require them to
incur thousands of dollars of debt and provide little or no increased earning power.
The federal gainful employment regulations had an immediate effect, and a
comparable state rule might have similar results. Approximately sixty percent of the
programs that were on track to lose access to Title IV funding because of
unacceptable student debt-to-earnings ratios “shut down even before the rule would
have terminated their financial aid.”131 Nevertheless, the Trump administration
repealed the gainful employment rule, effective July 2020.132 The Trump

127. BEN MILLER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GRADUATE SCHOOL DEBT 9 (2020), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/2020/01/13/479220/graduate
-school-debt/ [ https://perma.cc/4KC9-J8WK ] (“That regulation defined a long-standing statutory
requirement that certain programs and types of institutions had to show they provided training leading
to gainful employment in a recognized occupation.”); see also Gainful Employment Information,
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/school/ge [ https://perma.cc/Z4BCUSZQ ] ( last visited Sept. 23, 2020 ) (“Generally, in order to be eligible for funding under the Higher
Education Act Title IV student assistance programs, an educational program must lead to a degree at a
nonprofit or public institution or it must prepare students for ‘gainful employment in a
recognized occupation.’”).
128. DELGADO, supra note 27, at 7.
129. 34 C.F.R. § 668.403 (2015); see also Gainful Employment Information, supra note 127; THE
INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, WHAT TO KNOW ABOUT THE GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT RULE
(2019), https://ticas.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/what_to_know_about_GE_fact-sheet-1.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/V6V2-L7TH ] (“The GE rule was based on a simple idea: typical graduates need to
earn enough to afford to repay their loans. The rule required any program where typical graduates’ debts
exceed both 8 percent of their total income and 20 percent of discretionary income to improve or lose
access to federal financial aid.”); Miller, supra note 127, at 9 (Conversely, “[i]f a program fails to stay
under the prescribed debt-to-income ratio defined in the gainful employment regulation for multiple
years, the program loses access to federal aid.”).
130. THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, supra note 129.
131. MILLER, supra note 127, at 10.
132. Department of Education Repeals Gainful Employment Regulations, AM. COUNCIL ON
EDUC. ( July 1, 2019), https://www.acenet.edu/News-Room/Pages/Department-of-EducationRepeals-Gainful-Employment-Regulations.aspx [ https://perma.cc/4YAL-QW53 ]; M C C ANN
& LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 31.
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administration suggested that disclosure—via the College Scorecard—better serves
the needs of students than the gainful employment rule.133
A subsequent administration may reinstate the federal gainful employment
rule regulations and the “data-matching agreement with the Social Security
Administration that permitted the use of administrative data to calculate
post-college earnings for such programs.”134 In addition, Congress could mandate
such information sharing, which would make it more difficult for a future
administration to undo.
But states should consider implementing their own version of the gainful
employment rule anyway.135 Hundreds of thousands of students attend or have
attended programs that would not satisfy the federal gainful employment rule.136
These students hold billions in debt that the gainful employment rule suggests that
they will struggle to repay.137 Importantly, “[s]tudents of color account for more
than half of the undergraduate enrollment at for-profit colleges, and they are
disproportionately impacted by the high-cost, low-quality programs identified and
addressed by the [gainful employment rule].”138 In other words, the gainful
employment rule—like student loan debt more generally—is a racial justice issue.
Ostensibly, ED remains committed to transparency and has therefore made
available a significant amount of information about student outcomes vis-à-vis the
College Scorecard.139 States could use this data to begin to create their own gainful
employment-like rule. For example, the Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF)
created a tool based on College Scorecard data that allows students (or regulators)
to examine which schools produce graduates with high debt burdens relative to their

133. See Department of Education Repeals Gainful Employment Regulations, supra note 132 (“In
announcing the decision to formally repeal the gainful employment regulations, Secretary of Education
Betsy DeVos referred to changes to add more information to the federal College Scorecard, saying, ‘All
schools should be clear and transparent about their outcomes and all students should have a full range
of information available. We’re committed to making that happen.’”).
134. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 31.
135. See BLAGG & WASHINGTON, supra note 36, at 1 (“Using longitudinal datasets, some states
now provide their own estimates [of what students earn after college] by institution and program.”).
136. THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, supra note 129 (“More than 350,000 students
have completed programs at schools that failed to meet the guidelines established by the GE Rule.”).
137. Id. (“These students hold nearly $7.5 billion in student debt they are unlikely to be able
to repay.”).
138. Id.
139. See Find the Right Fit, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: COLL. SCORECARD, https://
collegescorecard.ed.gov/ [ https://perma.cc/X6WP-83XL ] ( last visited Sept. 23, 2020 ); see also
Department of Education Repeals Gainful Employment Regulations, supra note 132. There are, however,
substantial limitations with these data. See Why the College Scorecard Should Complement – Not Replace
– the Gainful Employment Standards, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://
ticas.org/accountability/gainful-employment/why-the-college-scorecard-should-complement-notreplace-the-gainful-employment-standards/
[ https://perma.cc/2DC7-QQLZ ]
(discussing
limitations with the College Scorecard data).
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earnings.140 “According to TPPF’s analysis, just 73% of students at public colleges
are enrolled in a passing program, along with 62% of those at private nonprofit
schools. (At for-profits, the proportion is sixty-three percent.)”141
It is possible, however, that ED would stop sharing this information if states
began to use it to calculate their own version of the gainful employment rule because
ED has shown itself to be hostile to this sort of outcomes-based metric. In addition,
the data is (mostly) not program-level data and therefore is not as fine-grained as it
could be.142 Moreover, the data is only available for less than one quarter of all
college programs and only for graduates one year after they complete their
education.143 Therefore, states should use their own data instead of getting this
information from the Treasury Department.144 Since the early 2000s, states have
begun to collect substantially more data about postsecondary students.145 For
example, Tennessee now collects “measures of student progress and completion,
including credit hour accumulation, transfer, graduation rates, and number of
degrees conferred.”146 And this data is both differentiated by institution type and
broken down into subpopulations of students, “including adult students,
140. Andrew Gillen, College Earnings and Debt, TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND., https://
www.texaspolicy.com/college-earnings-and-debt/ [ https://perma.cc/E548-7ZQM ] ( last visited
Sept. 23, 2020 ); see also Cooper, supra note 25.
141. Cooper, supra note 25.
142. See Michael Itzkowitz, Overpromised, Underdelivered: The Limitations of the Department of
Education’s Transparency Efforts, REALCLEAREDUCATION (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.realcleare
ducation.com/articles/2019/09/25/overpromised_underdelivered_the_limitations_of_the_
department_of_educations_transparency_efforts__110358.html [ https://perma.cc/LJC7-8C5Q ]
(discussing limitations with the data provided by ED).
143. Id. (“[T]he Department released as part of this effort so far are underwhelming, to say the
least. Out of the 194,575 higher education programs across the United States, only 42,430 (22%) have
information available on the median loan debt of graduates. Furthermore, the data that was released
hides the outcomes of certain types of programs more than others.”).
144. All states collect information on quarterly earnings for many (but not all) in-state workers.
See JULIE M. WHITTAKER & KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33362, UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE: PROGRAMS AND BENEFITS 6 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33362.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/HZT2-44BS ]; see also BLAGG & WASHINGTON, supra note 36, at 3 (noting that some
states have earnings data, but that data—typically from unemployment insurance programs—only
covers people who work for an in-state employer, thus excluding various categories of people including
the self-employed and people who leave the state); KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 3 (arguing that
gainful employment-like measurement requires “connecting wage information from unemployment
insurance databases to postsecondary-enrollment information”); KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra
note 26, at 7 (“Similarly, states should take steps to link data on postsecondary experience with earnings
and employment information. Some institutions already try to measure employment and earnings using
graduate surveys, but these are expensive to conduct and often suffer from low response rates. Linking
administrative data from postsecondary and wage records is likely to be more informative and less
expensive in the long run (despite start-up costs). With these data systems in hand, states would ideally
be able to connect average earnings to both institutions and degree programs.”); CHRISTINA
WHITFIELD, JOHN ARMSTRONG & DUSTIN WEEDEN, STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXEC. OFFICERS
ASS’N, STRONG FOUNDATIONS 2018: THE STATE OF STATE POSTSECONDARY DATA
SYSTEMS (2019).
145. See, e.g., JOHN ARMSTRONG & KATIE ZABACK, ASSESSING AND IMPROVING STATE
POSTSECONDARY DATA SYSTEMS 4 (2016).
146. Id. at 9.
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low-income students, and community college students.”147 Even more recently,
states have begun to link together students’ postsecondary and
workforce records.148
For now, there are substantial gaps in individual states’ data records because,
for example, the “data they hold is highly concentrated in the public sectors.”149
Approximately two-thirds of states do not currently collect any information from
private nonprofit IHEs and even fewer collect information from for-profit
IHEs.150 And in the eighteen states that do collect information from private IHEs,
“coverage of independent institutions is often limited to those that participate in
financial aid programs or to institutions that volunteer to submit data to the state
postsecondary agency.”151 But this is a choice that states are making. States can and
should demand the data they need as a condition of the school’s reauthorization.152
Another important gap in state data records exists because workforce data is
typically drawn from state unemployment insurance records, which exclude various
categories of people, including those employed out of state.153 States can address
this gap by sharing data amongst themselves, thereby gaining a more accurate
picture of post-college earnings.154 And states have been doing just this. Whether

147. Id. at 5.
148. WHITFIELD ET AL., supra note 144, at 16 (“Fifty-one agencies in 46 states link or plan to
link postsecondary and workforce data (nine agencies in nine states plan to link).”); ARMSTRONG
& ZABACK, supra note 145, at 7 (“[C]onnections between students’ postsecondary and workforce
records have also expanded.”); see also KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 7 (providing
examples from Florida, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, and Colorado, and describing these states as
“leading the way in linking unemployment insurance and postsecondary records and reporting
those data”).
149. WHITFIELD ET AL., supra note 144, at 8. Another important gap is in state workforce
records, which typically come from state unemployment insurance records. See supra note 144. These
records only cover people who work for an in-state employer, excluding various categories of people
including the self-employed, people who leave the state, people who work for the federal government
and others. See BLAGG & WASHINGTON, supra note 36, at 4.
150. WHITFIELD ET AL., supra note 144, at 8 (“Roughly one-third of respondents indicated they
collect information from institutions in other sectors: 18 agencies collected information from
independent (private, nonprofit) institutions, 12 from proprietary (private, for-profit) institutions, and
three from tribal institutions.”); ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 1 (“Only 18 states surveyed
by State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO) collected information from private,
not-for-profit institutions.”).
151. ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 7–8.
152. For example, California has taken its first steps toward creating a state-level,
gainful-employment rule in California Assembly Bill 1340, which “would require an institution subject
to the act to collect and retain for each graduate completing a program at that institution on or after
January 1, 2020, individual identifying information, the program the graduate was enrolled in, and
specified student loan debt information.” Assemb. B. 1340, 2019-2020 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
153. See Department of Education Repeals Gainful Employment Regulations, supra note 132;
ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 2 (“Often, unemployment insurance records are used to
determine wage outcomes of graduates.”); see also supra text accompanying note 149 (noting other
limitations with this data).
154. “Colorado, Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin have partnered with the LEHD program at
the US Census Bureau to develop nationwide earnings data for students who leave postsecondary
institutions.” BLAGG & WASHINGTON, supra note 36, at 9 (noting that using only one state’s data may

First to Printer_Bruckner_BB Edits.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

FORGOTTEN STEWARDS

10/26/20 1:49 PM

25

by entering into memoranda of understanding between state agencies or developing
data sharing agreements, more than half of the states now share these types of data
with each other.155 There are regional data sharing arrangements as well. For
example, Hawaii, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington share data with each other
through the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education’s Multistate
Longitudinal Data Exchange to better understand outcomes for students who cross
state lines.156 While multistate information-sharing agreements are more
administratively cumbersome (and expensive) than using the Treasury
Department’s data, it creates the potential for an end run of a recalcitrant
federal government.157
2. Cohort Default Rates
As noted above, more than one million student loan borrowers default on
their federal student loans each year.158 These defaults occur despite an exceedingly
generous definition of default.159 The Cohort Default Rate (CDR) is a consumer
protection measure designed to shield students from extremely low-quality IHEs
and stop the flow of tax dollars to these institutions.160 IHEs are ineligible to receive
federal financial aid if they have three consecutive default rates that exceed thirty
percent.161 The CDR is the only financial outcome-based metric used by ED to
assess institutional quality.162

bias earnings data downwards because “students who move out of state may be more likely to earn
more than those who do not move”); ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 2 (“[M]ore
cross-state collaboration could improve the quality of reporting on student workforce outcomes.”).
While there are some privacy-focused concerns with this approach, states appear to be
comfortable with what they can and cannot share. See ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 11
(“Addressing privacy related to education data is particularly challenging because there is significant
variation in privacy laws across both sectors and states.”).
155. Slightly more than half the states reportedly “house data from various government agencies
in a central warehouse.” ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 5.
156. Id. at 6.
157. See BLAGG & WASHINGTON, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that some “states are partnering
with nearby states to follow residents when they move or take jobs in a neighboring state”).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 38–40.
159. See infra text accompanying note 164.
160. See Michael Itzkowitz, Why the Cohort Default Rate Is Insufficient, THIRD WAY (Nov. 7,
2017), https://www.thirdway.org/report/why-the-cohort-default-rate-is-insufficient [ https://
perma.cc/F8GR-R3UW ] (discussing how the CDR was intended to protect students from “lowperforming providers” and “bad actors”); see also MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 27 (explaining
that the CDR “was designed to penalize colleges where a disproportionate share of borrowers default
on their loans”).
161. Or a single year with a CDR of greater than 40%. See Itzkowitz, supra note 147 (citing 34
C.F.R. § 668.206 (2011)); see also MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 27. The FY 2017 national
cohort default rate was 9.7%. Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools, FED. STUDENT AID, https://
www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html
[ https://perma.cc/G77A-PDGQ ]
(Aug. 27, 2020).
162. AKERS, supra note 37, at 5 (“The only current financial outcome used to assess the quality
of institutions that are eligible for federal aid is the cohort default rate.”).
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Unfortunately, the CDR metric is broken. ED’s ability to identify and remove
IHEs from Title IV eligibility using the CDR metric has been diminished by an
outdated definition of default.163 While many borrowers are seriously behind on
their payments, a student loan is not technically in default until it has gone between
270 and 360 days in nonrepayment.164 In many cases, borrowers can make no
payments on their student loan debt and still not be in default.165 As a result, while
only slightly more than half of all student loan debt is in active repayment, the
official student loan default rate is merely 11.5%.166 To put this number in context,
even with such a generous definition, the official “student loan default rate is higher
than the default rate for auto loans,”167 and exceeds the rate of delinquent mortgages
“during the peak of the housing crisis in 2010.”168
Simply put, the definition of “default” does not appropriately account for
students who are in forbearance, have a deferment, or use an income-driven
repayment plan.169 While these programs and grace periods are valuable, excluding
them from the definition of default allows IHEs to remain eligible for Title IV even
though most of their students would—objectively—be considered to struggle with
their educational debts.170 For example, at almost 500 institutions “less than
163. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (2001), which defines default as:
The failure of a borrower and endorser, if any, or joint borrowers on a PLUS or Consolidation
loan, to make an installment payment when due, or to meet other terms of the promissory note,
the Act, or regulations as applicable, if the Secretary or guaranty agency finds it reasonable to
conclude that the borrower and endorser, if any, no longer intend to honor the obligation to repay,
provided that this failure persists for—
(1) 270 days for a loan repayable in monthly installments; or
(2) 330 days for a loan repayable in less frequent installments.
Cf. Cohort Default Rates, FINAID, https://www.finaid.org/loans/cohortdefaultrates.phtml
[ https://perma.cc/2KA7-EHS2 ] ( last visited Sept. 23, 2020 ); MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at
29 (“[I]ts utility in identifying poor-performing schools and removing them from the federal aid
program has continued to decline.”); Itzkowitz, supra note 160 (claiming that “[t]he implementation of
the initial CDR law was extremely effective, leading to a significant decline in defaults across the
country” and “a significant number of fly-by-night institutions failed the CDR test, lost access to federal
funding, and closed down . . . [which is] exactly what the CDR is supposed to do”).
164. 34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (2001); see also Bruckner et al., No-Contest, supra note 44, at 189 n.25;
Itzkowitz, supra note 160 (defining default as a borrower’s inability “to make a single payment on their
loans within the past 360 days”).
165. See Itzkowitz, supra note 160 (discussing $0 income-driven repayment (IDR) plans).
166. See Flynn, supra note 40. While “the reported default rate for federally managed loans is
11.5 percent . . . , the true default rate is actually more than 17 percent.” Id. at 3. These figures do not
include private student loans, which have higher repayment rates than federal student loans. The rest is
in some form of grace period, such as forbearance or deferment, an income-driven repayment plan, or
in default. See id.
167. Bruckner et al., No-Contest, supra note 44, at 189 n.25 (citing Ben Miller, Who Are Student
Loan Defaulters?, C TR . FOR A M . P ROGRESS (Dec. 14, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/2017/12/14/444011/student-loan-defaulters/
[ https://perma.cc/GA3E-TK7H ]).
168. Itzkowitz, supra note 160.
169. See id.
170. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 30 (claiming that “[c]olleges that left the majority
of their students struggling to repay, though not defaulting, were able to skirt accountability” and
reporting that “[l]ast year alone, $25.4 billion in federal loans were in deferment due to economic
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one-quarter of their students had successfully begun to pay down their loans within
three years of leaving school and beginning repayment.”171 Some have even accused
IHEs of manipulating their repayment statistics to avoid a failing CDR score.172
Thus, it appears that the definition of default needs to be amended if the CDR
metric is to be useful for protecting students from IHEs with poor outcomes.173
Any metric that faults only ten IHEs a year—like the CDR—even though there are
three times as many IHEs (thirty-two) “where less than one in 10 students were able
to pay down $1 of their loan principal within three years of leaving” is a flawed
metric.174 There may not be political will at the federal level for this redefinition
exercise,175 but there’s no reason why states could not adopt their own CDR rules
for use in their own (re)authorization decisions. They could, for example, use loan
repayment rates measuring “the percentage of borrowers who succeed in lowering
their loan balance over a given period of time.”176 States “should also institute
program-level accountability based on graduates’ debt relative to their incomes,
even at nonprofit and public degree-granting institutions.”177
Unfortunately, if the definition of “default” was amended at the state level, it
may make it harder for states to obtain the data they need because ED won’t simply
be able to share what they have. However, ED does have (and currently shares) data

hardship” and “even though these students are struggling financially, they do not count negatively
against an institution’s CDR”).
171. Itzkowitz, supra note 160 (discussing data from 2014–2015).
172. AKERS, supra note 37, at 5 (“While the cohort default rate is designed to capture the ability
of graduates to repay their debts, it falls short because colleges manipulate repayment statistics by
encouraging students to enroll in programs that postpone repayment. Student borrowers can use a
variety of tactics to avoid having their loan enter default while still failing to make any progress in paying
down their balance.”); Itzkowitz, supra note 160 (claiming that some IHEs use
“unscrupulous . . . default prevention strategies” to avoid failing the CDR metric and that ED is aware
that its metric is “susceptible to gaming behavior”).
173. See MILLER, supra note 127, at 12 (“Rather than capping debt based on the earnings of
completers, graduate programs could instead be held accountable if many students are unable to repay
their debts or are heavily reliant on options such as IDR, which sets payments at a share of income.”);
Robert Kelchen, How Well Do Default Rates Reflect Student Loan Repayment?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 30,
2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2015/09/30/how-well-dodefault-rates-reflect-student-loan-repayment/ [ https://perma.cc/HA86-FTLM ] (“All of these
complications make cohort default rates a weak metric of whether students are actually paying back
their loans.”).
Another flaw with the CDR metric, not otherwise addressed in this Article, is that the CDR data
is old data. For example, “[t]he FY 2017 official cohort default rates were delivered to both domestic
and foreign schools on September 28, 2020.” Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools, supra note 161.
174. See Itzkowitz, supra note 160.
175. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 30 (“House Republican and Democratic bills
introduced this year both sought to incorporate a measure of delinquency to the existing default
rate . . . .”).
176. AKERS, supra note 37, at 5 (“The advantage of this metric is that it reveals when borrowers
don’t make progress in paying down their loans because they are eligible for programs that postpone
payments without causing their loan to be reported as delinquent.”).
177. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 35; see also Itzkowitz, supra note 21 (discussing a
value-added measure of higher education quality).
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on repayment rates via the College Scorecard.178 It is not clear, though, whether ED
would continue to share this data if states were using it to calculate their own CDR
rates. This would be a substantial impediment to state implementation of a revised
CDR-like metric because most of this data is only collected by student
loan servicers.179
3. Financial Responsibility Rules
Through its Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA), ED measures the financial
health of IHEs using its financial responsibility score.180 “Colleges are scored on a
scale from -1.0 to 3.0.”181 IHEs need a score a 1.0 or better to participate in any
Title IV programs,182 though an IHE is subject to heightened scrutiny if it scores
between 1.0 and 1.4.183 In academic year 2016–17, more than ten percent of IHEs
either received a failing score or were subject to additional oversight.184
There are three problems with the current financial responsibility metric. First,
these scores are not a particularly useful way to analyze an IHE’s current financial
health because they rely on old data.185 The scores are based on IHE’s audited

178. ED shares data on the percent of undergraduate students reducing their original principal
balance over a three-year, backwards-looking period. See Download the Data, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC.: COLL. SCORECARD, https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/data/ [ https://perma.cc/ALN2YDV4 ] (June 1, 2020). This data is limited by ED decision to suppress this information at schools with
cohorts of fewer than thirty students because of accuracy concerns. See TECHNICAL
DOCUMENTATION: COLLEGE SCORECARD INSTITUTION-LEVEL DATA 24 (2020), https://
collegescorecard.ed.gov/assets/FullDataDocumentation.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/K2BE-9YVQ ]
(“Data are also suppressed for institutions with fewer than 30 students, where the outcome of a single
student could dramatically change the rate.”).
179. However, states could use their authority to license student loan servicers to impose data
collection obligations on them. E.g., H.B. 10, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (imposing a
wide range of obligations on student loan servicers before they can operate in Virginia); cf. infra text
accompanying notes 231–33.
180. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 30; Robert Kelchen, Which Colleges Failed the
Latest Financial Responsibility Test?, ROBERT KELCHEN (Apr. 15, 2019), https://robertkelchen.com/
2019/04/15/which-colleges-failed-the-latest-financial-responsibility-test/ [ https://perma.cc/
876X-6R59 ].
181. Kelchen, supra note 173; see also Financial Responsibility Composite Scores, FED. STUDENT
AID, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/school/composite-scores [ https://perma.cc/DJU8-2YHK ]
( last visited Sept. 23, 2020 ).
182. 34 C.F.R. § 668.15(a) (2000); Financial Responsibility Composite Scores, supra note 181; see
also 2 FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT AID HANDBOOK: 2019–2020,
at 89 (2020) [ hereinafter FSA HANDBOOK ], https://ifap.ed.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
2020-01/1920FSAHbkVol2Ch4.pdf [ https://perma.cc/ZNY8-URDZ ] (“To participate in the FSA
programs, a school must demonstrate that it is financially responsible.”).
183. Kelchen, supra note 180; Financial Responsibility Composite Scores, supra note 181 (“The
overall relative financial health of institutions [falls] along a scale from negative 1.0 to positive 3.0. A
score greater than or equal to 1.5 indicates the institution is considered financially responsible.”).
184. Kelchen, supra note 180.
185. Id. (“The data are already three years old, which is an eternity for a college on the brink of
collapse (but perhaps not awful for a cash-strapped nonprofit college with a strong will to live on).”);
FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 182, at 89 (“[S]chools are required to submit financial information to the
Department every year. A school must provide this financial information in the form of an audited
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financial statements, which aren’t due until six to nine months after the school’s
fiscal year ends.186 Thus, an IHE that encounters a significant financial shock early
in its fiscal year might not share that information with FSA for more than eighteen
months. At that point, it is often far too late regulators to act. For example, almost
as soon as ED announced that it would delay providing Title IV funds to Corinthian
Colleges for a mere three weeks, the for-profit chain of colleges announced it would
sell or close its campuses and operations.187 Without current data, it’s no wonder
that the FSA “has failed to keep up with the scale and scope of problems in higher
education around the country.”188
But the FSA processes could be improved.189 First, the federal government
(or states if the federal government won’t act) could require more current
information.190 For example, IHEs could be required to promptly report “steep
declines in enrollment and tuition revenues (which can be an indicator of financial
problems).”191 Additionally, IHEs could be required to report if they fail to pay a

financial statement as part of a combined submission that also includes the school’s compliance audit.
For-profit schools have six months from the end of the schools’ fiscal year to provide the combined
submission; other schools have nine months.”).
186. FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 182. But at least this data is considered by ED. States do not
universally require IHEs to annually submit audited financial statements. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note
15, at 21 (“For existing institutions and those seeking renewal, authorizers ought to require the annual
submission of audited financial statements and any additional financial information they need to
measure the financial viability of the institutions and to ensure they are operating in accordance with
relevant laws and regulations.”).
187. Jose Luis Magana, School Daze: Students at Troubled Corinthian Colleges Say They’re in the
Dark, NBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014, 9:54 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/education/schooldaze-students-troubled-corinthian-colleges-say-theyre-dark-n190456 [ https://perma.cc/78M2-2FCY ]
(“In early July, Corinthian announced it would be selling or closing its 107 campuses and online
operations. The announcement came after the Department of Education withheld Corinthian’s Pell
grants and loan funds for 21 days, claiming the company was taking too long with a request for detailed
records of their students’ performance.”).
188. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 30.
189. Id. at 31 (“FSA’s processes have proven wholly inadequate to respond to—or better yet,
prevent—the abuse of federal dollars and prevalence of poor performing colleges in the system.”); Rick
Seltzer, Regulating College Closures, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 23, 2019) [ hereinafter Seltzer, Regulating ],
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/23/massachusetts-regulators-propose-effortsprotect-students-unexpected-college [ https://perma.cc/QTM4-FU5E ] (“[E]xisting metrics that could
mark stressed institutions, like the federal government’s Financial Responsibility Composite Score, have
failed to identify problems with colleges and universities in the years leading up to their closure and
have sometimes flagged colleges with considerable resources.”).
190. Rick Seltzer, What to Know About Lists of Financially Challenged Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Nov. 19, 2019) [ hereinafter Seltzer, Lists ], https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/11/01/
publishing-colleges-financial-information-has-long-history-and-raises-larger-set [ https://perma.cc/
A97E-28QV ] (“More recently, the idea of publishing financial evaluations became a hot topic at the
state level. After Mount Ida College suddenly collapsed in 2018 . . . officials in Massachusetts started
looking into new state requirements designed to prevent colleges from closing without warning
students. . . . At the beginning of this year, Massachusetts regulators moved to screen all private
nonprofit colleges’ finances and warn students one and a half years before their colleges were at risk
of closing.”).
191. Robert Kelchen & Kenneth Megan, Another University Is Imploding. The Federal
Government Must Do More, ROLL CALL (Mar. 11, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://
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debt when it is due (or even if it anticipates not paying a debt when it becomes
due).192 Similarly, IHEs could be forced to promptly disclose actual or anticipated
lawsuits involving a material sum.193 Regulators might have differing views as to
exactly which information to require, but “[i]t turns out this is not rocket science.”194
“Those who know what to look for probably already have a good idea of the
colleges and universities that are in financial trouble. It’s often institutions that are
starting to spend more than they collect.”195
In other words, regulators need to collect a broader array of data related to an
IHE’s potential financial distress and to collect that data in a more timely fashion.196
IHEs, like public companies, could be required to timely report any significant news
likely to affect their financial future.197 Like IHEs, public companies are required to
file annual financial reports (known as 10-Ks).198 But public companies are also
required to file quarterly updates (10-Q reports) and to provide extremely prompt
updates upon the happening of certain significant events (8-Ks).199 Unlike with
disclosures by public companies, disclosures by IHEs need not be made public but
could be provided only to regulators. These changes to the financial responsibility

www.rollcall.com/2019/03/11/another-university-is-imploding-the-federal-government-must-do-more/
[ https://perma.cc/WS5E-UP3F ] (calling on the federal government to collect such information
“quarterly, improving timeliness and providing regulators with better information on institutions with
deteriorating financial health”); see also Seltzer, Lists, supra note 190 (highlighting another important
piece of information: when an IHE’s net expenses are expected to exceed its net assets); Seltzer,
Regulating, supra note 189 (“Working group documents[, which are located at https://
www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/03e_THESIS%20Deck.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/6UZQ-RXA8 ],] indicate that 24 percent of private nonprofit four-year institutions in the
state experienced enrollment decreases of 10 percent or more between 2011 and 2016.”).
192. Both of these are salient to the Secretary of Education’s determination of whether an IHE
is financially responsible. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.15(b) (2000) (“In general, the Secretary considers an
institution to be financially responsible only if it . . . (4) Is current in its debt payments. The institution
is not considered current in its debt payments if—(i) The institution is in violation of any existing loan
agreement at its fiscal year end, as disclosed in a note to its audited financial statement; or (ii) the
institution fails to make a payment in accordance with existing debt obligations for more than 120 days,
and at least one creditor has filed suit to recover those funds.”).
193. Id.
194. Seltzer, Lists, supra note 190.
195. Id.
196. “[U]pdates should be made speedily and narrowly.” MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14,
at 34; see also WORKING GRP., MASS. DEP’T OF HIGHER EDUC., FINAL REPORT
& RECOMMENDATIONS, TRANSITIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS
OF STUDENTS (THESIS) 7 (2019) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP documents], https://www.inside
highered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/THESIS%20Working%20Group%20Final%20
Report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/X2GN-MTF8 ] (noting the need “to significantly improve on the
timeliness of awareness of growing risk at specific” IHEs).
197. “Colleges should be required to report in a timely manner when they experience significant
financial risks.” MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 34.
198. Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://
www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/exchangeactreporting [ https://perma.cc/Q9F6-4NUL ]
(Oct. 24, 2018); FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 182.
199. Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, supra note 198.
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rules could help by informing regulators when an event occurs that creates a
“significant risk of closure or other liabilities owed to the federal government.”200
Second, FSA is also an (overly) cautious regulator. There are various reasons
for this caution, including that “FSA has been underfunded” and understaffed.201
Nor has the FSA been “empowered to take more, stronger, and swifter action when
it finds concerning indicators.”202 “Oversight of colleges is not among FSA’s stated
goals in the law.”203 As a result, “FSA typically acts out of an overabundance of
caution, waiting until problems are too far along before taking serious action. And
lengthy due process requirements for colleges make it difficult for FSA to take
action early, subjecting students to harm for a longer period of time.”204 Thus, a
state regulator empowered to act on concerning financial responsibility scores
might be an effective strategy for protecting students.
In response to Mount Ida’s precipitous collapse in 2018, the Massachusetts
Board of Higher Education convened its Working Group in early 2019.205 This
Working Group determined that the “existing regulators . . . and existing metrics
[were] insufficient to provide early enough warning or action.”206 In response, it
proposed to “screen all private nonprofit colleges’ finances and warn students one
and a half years before their colleges were at risk of closing.”207 The goal is to define
a threshold at which an IHE’s financial condition creates a “meaningful risk of
interruption” for students, triggering the need to notify students and prepare a
contingency plan for the institution.208 And the information used to calculate a risk
score is based exclusively on “existing, publicly reported data and requires no
further information from colleges.”209

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 34.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
See Seltzer, Lists, supra note 190.
WORKING GROUP documents, supra note 196, at 1.
Seltzer, Lists, supra note 190; KASIA LUNDY, HAVEN LADD & ALI HUBERLIE, ERNST
& YOUNG-PARTHENON, TRANSITIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (2018), https://www.mass.edu/
strategic/documents/EY-Parthenon%20Transitions%20in%20Higher%20Ed.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
BW2R-3TFT ] (describing the Teachout Viability Metric as a method for assessing whether an
institution has sufficient financial resources to teach out current students through to graduation on its
own campus).
208. “The proposed plan centers on a clear goal – to ensure that any college that reaches a
defined threshold where its financial condition puts current and recently admitted students at
meaningful risk of interruption in their educations must prepare necessary contingency plans and must
inform the students and other stakeholders when that risk becomes sufficiently imminent.” WORKING
GROUP documents, supra note 196, at 1; see also Seltzer, Regulating, supra note 189.
209. WORKING GROUP documents, supra note 196, at 2. While many of these data are available
publicly, most of them have never been combined to create a metric that takes into account financial
information, enrollment information, and a host of other factors. Id. This is not meant to undermine
my earlier claim that updated information would be better information. Rather, I mean to suggest only
that we need not wait for better information before acting.
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Finally, a related problem is that colleges experiencing significant financial
risks are not forced to protect taxpayers by, among other things, having sufficiently
large letters of credit on file.210 Letters of credit are rarely required and usually too
small “to cover the entirety of the closed-school discharge liabilities” even when
they are in place.211 Less than one in ten closed institutions with more than “$1
million in closed-school discharge liabilities” had a letter of credit on file.212 Better
disclosures could help ensure that more IHEs have appropriately large letters of
credit to protect taxpayers when other measures are insufficient.213
B. Mechanisms to Improve Institutional Quality
There are several mechanisms by which states could protect students from
low-value or exploitative IHEs. One is through their power to authorize businesses
operating in their state (whether with a brick-and-mortar or a virtual presence).214
State authorization has traditionally been used as a stick to punish bad actors. But
instead of authorization being a binary option (an entity is authorized and can
operate, or it does not and cannot), a broader array of authorizations could be
offered. For instance, authorization may be subject to various restrictions,
restrictions akin to endorsements on an individual’s driver license. Just like a person
needs to satisfy different requirements to be licensed to drive a motorcycle rather
than a car, IHEs might apply for various endorsements if they want to expand
operations to a new location, accept significantly more students, or similar changes.
Other mechanisms to compel IHEs to protect students include the use of
tuition-assistance grants for students and performance-based funding for public
IHEs. These mechanisms can serve as a carrot to go along with the stick of
threatening to terminate an IHE’s authorization or deny it an endorsement. By

210. Cf. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 11 (discussing the surety bond requirement that most
higher education boards require but noting that they tend to be small, $500,000 at the high end and
only $10,000 at the low end); AKERS, supra note 37 (suggesting that risk-sharing payments might be
used to protect taxpayers).
211. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 34 (reporting that of the “62 institutions that
closed between 1987 and 2016 and had over $1 million in closed-school discharge liabilities—just six
institutions had letters of credit on file, and only one had a letter of credit large enough to cover the
entirety of the closed-school discharge liabilities”).
212. Id.
213. Maggio, supra note 87, at 172 (“[T]he total amount of the fund and the amounts awarded
to students on an annual basis are minimal considering the size of the state’s enrollment.”).
214. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 2 (“Authorization in a state is typically required if an
institution is deemed to have a ‘physical presence’ in the state—a definition that hinges on certain types
of activities, such as advertising to students, employing faculty, or providing on-the-ground services.”);
see also CHALOUX, supra note 94, at 8 (“States use a variety of approaches in licensing and authorizing
institutions to operate and grant degrees in their jurisdictions.”); HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 5
(“Authorization is usually required if an institution has a ‘physical presence’ in the state, a definition
that can be triggered based on a range of activities, such as employing faculty or advertising to
students.”). But cf. NC-SARA, supra note 125 (noting that NC-SARA substantially limits states’ ability
to impose additional regulations on entities that do not have a physical presence in the state (e.g., operate
entirely online)).
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offering additional funds only to IHEs that meet certain performance-based criteria,
states can push IHEs to improve student outcomes.215
1. State Authorization
States have well-established authority to regulate IHEs.216 State authorization
is both required by federal law and prudent as a matter of public policy.217 States
can leverage an IHE’s need for state authorization to protect students at two
stages: when they first authorize an IHE and when the IHE needs to renew its
authorization.218 “The establishment—and continuous approval process—places
tremendous responsibility on the state to assure that new and existing institutions
are capable of meeting their educational missions and are operating in the best
interests of their students and the state.”219 This places state policymakers in a
powerful position to protect students by shaping the higher
education marketplace.220
a. Initial Authorization
States’ approaches to setting initial authorization requirements vary. Some
states have required only that an IHE be properly incorporated or accredited to be
authorized to operate.221 Obviously, this provides very little protection for students
and does not represent a state’s embrace of its “powerful position.”222 By contrast,
other states use “a comprehensive authorization and renewal process that evaluates
215. “The report acknowledges that some colleges and universities could resist the process
proposed. It suggests making them ineligible for state student financial aid if they do not agree to the
plan, a considerable penalty in a state with meaningful grants for state residents who enroll at private
colleges.” Seltzer, Regulating, supra note 189; see also WORKING GROUP documents, supra note 196
(discussing the tethering of active monitoring to continued access to state financial aid and that “[i]t is
fair and appropriate for Massachusetts to place such strings upon publicly financed aid provided
to schools”).
216. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 7 (“[The] few court cases related to the state’s power
to authorize institutions . . . [provide] enough case law to establish a clear state authority to authorize
colleges and universities within its borders.”).
217. 34 C.F.R. § 600.2 (2011); Linehan, supra note 21, at 783 (“Under the present system, federal
law requires states to designate one or more administrative bodies to furnish school licensing
information, to notify the Department upon revocation of a school’s operating license, and notify the
Department when it has ‘credible evidence’ that a school has committed fraud in the administration of
federal student loans or has otherwise violated federal loan eligibility rules.”).
218. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 11 (“Clearly, the state authorization process should be
most comprehensive for entities seeking institutional status for the first time. This, as has been pointed
out, is the stage where few other quality assurance or regulatory mechanisms have reviewed the entity,
where little by way of data or track record tends to be available, and where the state must single-handedly
make a determination of legitimacy. But even the most robust upfront vetting process must be paired
with a regime of continuing, and appropriate, oversight to ensure that institutional performance does
satisfy the states’ baseline requirements.”).
219. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 5.
220. KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 2.
221. See HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 5 (“For some states, simple incorporation has been
deemed sufficient to declare an institution as legitimate.”); supra text accompanying note 94.
222. KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 2.
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a wide array of inputs and outcomes.”223 The latter approach is the only one that
can protect students.
In particular, states are the only entity that regulates unaccredited institutions
that do not receive Title IV funding, such as coding bootcamps.224 These
state-authorized, unaccredited institutions “represent an often-overlooked but
important segment of American higher education.”225 It is important that states
closely examine these institutions and “ensure that [students] are receiving a quality
education, as protections offered by accreditation and federal oversight [such as
they are] are unavailable.”226
Before initially authorizing their operations, states are well positioned to
evaluate whether IHEs are likely to provide students with a good-value education.
At this point, of course, state regulators are likely limited to evaluating the IHE’s
plans for educating students and the resources it intends to devote to the endeavor.
For example, states can assess “whether an entity has the expected internal resources
to deliver educational services—the classroom and course-inventories, the number
of faculty, and the general material and human resources necessary to perform as a
school.”227 And states already collect “lots of information about inputs,” such as
professors’ CVs, “student-faculty ratios,” school “floor plans, site plans, blueprints,
or square footage of facilities,” evidence of “appropriate equipment for students
and instructors,” and information “related to content and academic programs.”228

223. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 5.
224. See, e.g., Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Running Without State Approval, Lambda School Shows
Challenge of Regulating New Entities, EDUC. DIVE ( Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.educationdive.com/
news/running-without-state-approval-lambda-school-shows-challenge-of-regulating/570906/
[ https://perma.cc/SY8J-N5QN ] (discussing coding bootcamp, the Lambda School, which “has not
been approved as an educational entity in [California],” is not accredited, and does not accept Title IV
funds); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 20 (“[N]ew providers of alternative credentials . . . do not
seek accreditation or access to federal student financial aid and therefore operate outside of the
traditional regulatory triad. These entities operate boot camps, badging services, and the like, and are
often for-profit entities that should require regulation and authorization in order to ensure some level
of quality and consumer protection.”).
225. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 12 (“The growth and dominance of Title IV
participating postsecondary institutions has so dominated current thinking about state authorization
that policymakers often assume a rapid progression through state authorization to accreditation and
federal certification. A large number of credential-granting institutions, however, choose to operate
with nothing more than state authorization, and a number of these may even access public subsidies
through other agencies. State authorization serves as the only mechanism of establishing legitimacy and
assuring quality for such institutions.”); see also Bauer-Wolf, supra note 224 (highlighting a regulatory
disconnection in California between the California Attorney General office and “the government
agency that authorizes private institutions there, the Bureau for Private Postsecondary Education
(BPPE)”).
226. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 12.
227. Id. at 5.
228. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 7–8; see also Marilyn C. Kameen & Manuel J. Justiz, Using
Assessment in Higher Education to Improve Success for Minority Students, 66 PEABODY J. EDUC. 46, 49
(1988) (“Until recently, ‘input’ measures such as mean Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores of entering
students, number of books in the library, and percentage of faculty with terminal degrees, were used to
measure institutional quality. Little has been said, however, about the ability of the institution to
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States might systemize which information they collect229 and ensure that
authorization decisions are taken seriously by, for example, adequately funding the
office that authorizes new IHEs.230
b. Renewed Authorization
States generally required IHEs to renew their authorization ever year or two.231
Although they are limited to focusing on proposed inputs at the initial authorization
stage, at the authorization renewal stage, states should base their decisions on actual
student outcomes.232 States should mandate that all IHEs provide them with data
about “graduation rates, completions, student licensure/certification success rates,
job placement rates, and loan repayment and default rates, among other metrics.”233
With this information, states could produce their own versions of CDRs, financial
responsibility scores, and gainful employment rule to decide whether an IHE is
providing a good value to its students.234 Collecting and using information about
student outcomes is important for deciding whether an IHE should be allowed to
continue operating.235 Unfortunately, this is not always the case.236 For example, in

influence student learning and development. To focus on ‘results’ and ask questions about ‘output’
requires far more serious and systematic approaches to defining and assessing learning outcomes.”).
229. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 11 (arguing that states should “enable the creation of
a common matrix of ‘institutional vital signs,’ a set of quantitative metrics that would allow regulators
to focus their limited resources on institutions that pose the greatest risk to students and other
stakeholders. Items such as default rates, graduation rates, recorded consumer complaints, and certain
financial indicators could quickly direct more expansive and more comprehensive oversight to venues
where that might be needed more urgently.”).
230. Cf. Maggio, supra note 87, at 171 (reviewing one accreditor’s records—ASBPPE—showed
that the accreditor “is exceedingly generous in approving new licensure and program approval requests”
with no recorded rejections during the period of time studied).
231. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 11 (“[R]enewals [are] generally required every one to two
years.”); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 13 (“Seven states do not require regular reauthorization
or exempt some types of institutions from regular reauthorization. The frequency with which
institutions must renew their authorization varies by state, and it also varies within a state based on the
type of institution. Typically, in-state institutions are authorized for longer time periods, while
out-of-state institutions are required to renew their authorization more frequently. Most reauthorization
approvals hinge on maintenance of accreditation and fiscal viability; fewer states assess student
outcomes during the renewal process.”).
232. States can help ensure institutional capacity by collecting data, information, and assurances.
TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 5; TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 15 (“The need to
collect and address student learning outcomes was a topic of great interest and discussion at both
convenings.”).
233. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 19; TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 14.
234. For an alternative measure of how to evaluate whether IHEs are providing a good value
for students, see Itzkowitz, supra note 21.
235. “The establishment—and continuous approval process—places tremendous responsibility
on the state to assure that new and existing institutions are capable of meeting their educational missions
and are operating in the best interests of their students and the state.” TANDBERG ET AL., supra note
15, at 5; see also TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108.
236. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115 (highlighting the variety of approaches across states and
institution types).
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Arizona, “there is little cost to entry and few rules to play by.”237 And Arizona
“doesn’t require [IHEs] to account for particular outcomes in order to
participate.”238
Only about half of state IHEs supervisors even require institutions “to report
some measure of student outcomes.”239 But even in states that require such
reporting, there is some evidence to suggest that this information is not used
rigorously to decide whether to renew an IHE’s authorization to operate.240
Nevertheless, a survey of state higher education stakeholders suggested they may
have an appetite to require “institutions to submit assessable learning outcomes and
descriptions of how the proposed program will meet those outcomes in meaningful
ways [so that] during follow-up reviews of approved programs, states and systems
might require institutions to provide evidence of the programs’ success in
accomplishing the approved student learning outcomes.”241 States must act to
protect students because if they do not, many times no one else will.
Some states actively work to protect students in these ways. In Florida, Ohio,
and Oregon, state education officials are using student outcome data to evaluate
IHEs. Florida Commission for Independent Education, for example, requires an
improvement plan from unaccredited institutions whose placement rate falls below
sixty percent, with potential for license revocation should the institution’s
placement rate not improve.242 Similarly, the “Oregon Department of Education’s
Private Career School office may put a program on probation should its completion
or placement rate drop below fifty percent.”243 Ohio’s annual authorization
renewals, for example, include on-site inspections and a review of the institution’s
student outcomes, such as graduation and job placement rates.244

237. Maggio, supra note 87, at 148.
238. Id.
239. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 11 (“44 of the 70 state boards require institutions to
report some measure of student outcomes.”); see TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 13 (“Thirty-six
of the 70 state authorizing agencies do not require any measure of student outcomes to be reported in
the reauthorization process”); id. at 19 (“States may want to consider making participation in the state
postsecondary student unit record data system a part of the authorization process. Requiring institutions
that are seeking authorization or renewal to develop agreements for regular submissions to the state
postsecondary data system would ensure the collection of consistent data elements and outcomes
measures for all institutions. Moreover, states could match the student-level data with other state
data . . . .”).
240. Maggio, supra note 87, at 5 (discussing the impact of both “student financial aid and direct
institutional aid” but not disaggregating the two); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 10 (“Institutions
are not asked to provide any indicators of student success (graduation/completion rates, student loan
default rates, job placement rates).”).
241. TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 16.
242. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6E-2.004(10)(c) (2013) (“A nonaccredited institution holding
provisional or annual licensure shall report its placement rate as defined by the Commission with each
license review. If the placement rate falls below 60%, the Commission shall place the institution on a
placement improvement plan . . . . If the progress report does not show improvement as accepted by
the Commission, the Commission shall take actions up to and including revocation of license.”).
243. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 12.
244. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.
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Unfortunately, the required reporting varies substantially among states.245
Most pertinent to this Article—which suggests that states should adopt CDR
metrics, gainful employment rule, and financial responsibility scores—only
twenty-eight (of seventy) state boards require IHEs to report on “job-placement
rates,” only three “require wage data,” and only four require CDRs.246 In other
words, “[d]espite the rising concern over delinquency and default rates and
debt-to-income ratios, few states are considering the return on investment for
students when reauthorizing institutions to operate in their state.”247
States have an important role to play in protecting students. States should not
cede their obligations to protect students to other members of the triad.248 Instead,
states should invest in strengthening “the processes by which they carry out their
authorization functions.”249 “A central focus of the authorization process ought to
be quality assurance and improvement.”250 Admittedly, it will require difficult
political choices for state leaders to provide additional funding for this work,
particularly during the pandemic.
c. Endorsements on State Authorization
State authorization need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. Instead, states
could prod IHEs to provide better value to their students by embracing the idea of
tiered authorizations. An initial authorization could allow a new IHE to engage in
fairly limited operations. States might restrict the size and scope of an IHE’s
operations until the IHE has a demonstrated track record of producing good
student outcomes.251 At that point, the state might authorize the IHE to increase
enrollment, offer new majors, open a branch campus, or expand in other ways.
Some IHEs effectively police themselves along the lines that I have suggested.
For example, Long Island University (LIU) recently decided to freeze new
enrollment in several of its degree programs, while allowing existing students to

245. And sometimes it varies within a state, depending on which type of college is seeking
reauthorization. See Maggio, supra note 87, at 104–06 (discussing license renewals in New Jersey).
246. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 12 (“43 boards require graduation rates, 28 require
job-placement rates, 10 require retention rates, 4 require licensure exam passage rates, 4 require
cohort-default rates, and 3 require wage data.”).
247. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 13. But see TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at
16 (“[C]lose to 80 percent of survey respondents reported using quality assurance metrics in program
approval. However, program approval is often viewed as a bureaucratic compliance exercise with little
connection to other quality assurance efforts.”).
248. See TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 6.
249. Id.; see also TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 4 (“Making these processes
substantive and focused on quality assurance is challenging but necessary.”).
250. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 19.
251. But see Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, A New State Bill Could Challenge Key Interstate Distance
Learning Pact, EDUC. DIVE (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.educationdive.com/news/a-new-state-billcould-challenge-key-interstate-distance-learning-pact/573513/
[ https://perma.cc/ST3B-9W59 ]
(reporting on limitations states face in regulating IHEs that provide distance education because of
NC-SARA participation).
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complete their degrees.252 LIU’s vice president for academic affairs suggested that
the criteria for selecting which programs to discontinue was based on whether the
programs were “competitive, relevant and of the highest quality for our students.”253
Instead of relying on IHEs to self-police, state regulators could restrict IHEs from
offering programs that aren’t of the “highest quality.”254
2. Financial Incentives for Better Student Outcomes
In addition to the threat of declining an IHE’s authorization to operate in
state, a state could also use the carrot of making additional funds available. These
funds could be made available directly to students at eligible institutions or be given
directly to the institutions themselves. This section discusses two such
options: tuition assistance grants (TAGs) or performance-based funding.
Historically, TAG funding has only been available to nonprofit IHEs and
performance-based funding has only been available to public IHEs. Thus, the
primary mechanism for regulating for-profit IHEs will continue to
be authorization.255
a. Tuition Assistance Grants
States already provide substantial funding directly to students attending certain
IHEs. For example, “[i]n 2010–2011, nine percent of total student grant aid came
from state governments.”256 These TAGs are given to students at certain, usually
nonprofit, IHEs. Research has shown that this aid has “a weak but measurable
impact on the enrollments and finances of private institutions across the
United States.”257
If states were so inclined, TAGs might “become a highly effective lever” to
ensure that IHEs are meeting certain minimum expectations for student

252. See Elizabeth Redden, Putting Liberal Arts Programs on Ice, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 25,
2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/02/25/long-island-university-freezes-enrollmentsmany-liberal-arts-programs [ https://perma.cc/QC53-W38S ] (discussing Long Island University’s
decision to discontinue offering certain majors “in art history, earth system science, French, Italian,
music performance, Spanish, geography and geology”).
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. However, states could also levy “penalties for an assortment of violations.” TANDBERG
ET AL., supra note 15, at 21. While also a stick, penalties are not an all-or-nothing proposition like
authorization has historically been.
256. Maggio, supra note 87, at 22.
257. Id. at 5.
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outcomes.258 States could and should tie the availability of TAGs to whether the
student attends a high-performing IHE.259
Unfortunately, it generally doesn’t seem that states are using TAGs to improve
student outcomes because they are not tying continued access to TAGs to those
outcomes.260 Kelly, James, & Columbus found “few states actually renew
authorizations on the basis of [student] outcomes” despite a substantial majority of
states collecting student outcome data.261 For example, New Jersey “has one of the
nation’s most generous TAG programs, covering both nonprofit and for-profit
colleges,” but IHEs in New Jersey “are not required to engage in any reporting on
outcomes in order to justify their continued eligibility to receive the funding.”262
And other states, such as Arizona, don’t offer any sort of “statewide financial aid
program,” making this tool unavailable to them.263
b. Performance-Based Funding
While TAG funds flow directly to students, policymakers could also funnel
money directly to high-value IHEs. And most states do already use some version of
performance-based funding for public IHEs, in which money flows directly to the
IHEs based on achieving certain student outcome benchmarks.264 Common
benchmarks “include retention and graduation rates, job placement, graduation

258. Id. at 125 (“TAG grant frees them from reliance on federal standards [and] it also serves
as a mechanism for the state to ensure that for-profit institutions adhere to certain minimal standards.
Should the state ever wish to begin enforcing stricter standards or to enact new accountability
mechanisms, the availability of the TAG grant would become a highly effective lever with which to
coerce the cooperation of the for-profit sector.”); id. at 22 (explaining that TAGs “requir[e] institutions
participating in state grant programs to meet certain loan default rate standards”).
259. It is possible, however, that the cost of higher education is not salient to students for any
number of reasons. In that case, tying a student’s eligibility for a TAG to whether that student attends
a high-quality IHE might mean that students who attend low-quality IHEs would be worse off because
they’ll both receive a less useful degree and they’ll pay more for that degree. Cf. Jonathan D. Glater,
Law School, Debt, and Discrimination, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 548 (2019) (discussing various circumstances
where the least advantaged students would pay more for law school).
260. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 12 (describing the use of outcomes in state higher
education decision-making as “extremely rare”).
261. Id. at 12. But see KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 6 (claiming that few states
systemically collect useful student outcome data).
262. Maggio, supra note 87, at 121.
263. Id. at 207.
264. David A. Tandberg & Nicholas W. Hillman, State Higher Education Performance
Funding: Data, Outcomes, and Policy Implications, 39 J. EDUC. FIN. 222, 223 (2014) (“State performance
funding programs are incentive systems that link institution funding levels to performance outcomes.”);
ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 9 (reporting that twenty-six state higher education agencies
“indicated their states use a performance formula to allocate funds to postsecondary institutions”);
MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 19; Alicia C. Dowd, From Access to Outcome
Equity: Revitalizing the Democratic Mission of the Community College, 586 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 92, 109–10 (2003) (“Most state legislatures have embraced the practice of
linking tax-dollar support for public colleges to performance, even though a large share of public-college
officials remain convinced that doing so is a bad idea.”). But see KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note
26, at 4 (“[Nineteen] states were experimenting with some form of outcomes-based funding.”).
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credits and time to degree, licensure test scores, workforce training and
development, and two- to four-year transfers.”265 Funding levels vary between two
and ten percent of an IHEs funding.266
Historically, performance-based funding has been both limited to public IHEs
and of questionable efficacy to improve institutional quality. Some researchers have
found that incentives have either been insufficiently large or poorly tailored toward
improving student outcomes to create “a significant relationship between
performance funding and improved institutional performance.”267 For example, the
most frequently cited outcome that legislators claim to want when they embrace
performance funding is to improve degree completion rates.268 The efficacy of
performance funding is unclear. Some find the “introduction of performance
funding does not have a statistically significant impact on the total number of
baccalaureate degrees produced within the performance funding states.”269 But
other researchers have found that, “although the monetary incentives have not been
large, campus administrators have responded to them.”270 And one study from
Ohio “found that Ohio’s performance funding reduced median time to degree for
in-state bachelor’s students from 4.7 years to 4.3 years and led to a thirteen percent
increase in bachelor’s degrees for at-risk students.”271
Even if initial experiments with performance-based funding haven’t been as
effective as we might like, that does not mean that the idea should be abandoned.
Research suggests that states have been insufficiently patient with IHEs and that it
is not until the program is up and running for a long time that “performance funding
has a positive and significant impact on the number of degrees produced.”272
“Outcomes-based funding is not a new idea in higher education, but early efforts

265. Dowd, supra note 264, at 109; Tandberg & Hillman, supra note 264, at 223 (explaining that
outcomes include: “student retention, graduation rates, student scores on licensure exams, job
placement rates, faculty productivity, and campus diversity.”); Taylor, supra note 101, at 750
(“[I]nstitutions have had to provide evidence of successful outcomes, particularly as they relate to
student learning.”).
266. Tandberg & Hillman, supra note 264, at 224 (“Some states reserve up to 10% of an
institution’s funding as performance funding; others reserve as little as 2%. In most cases performance
funding serves as a bonus. However, a few states take performance funding further and embed it into
their base funding formula.”). But see KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 4 (“Tennessee has
the country’s boldest performance-based funding system—a 2010 law set up a system whereby 80–100
percent of the higher education budget is based on remedial course completion, retention rates, and
degree completion. Tennessee’s system pays a premium for completions by adult students and those
receiving Pell Grants. The performance criteria are weighted to reflect the different sectors—two-year
and open-access campuses are not held to the same standards as research universities.”).
267. Tandberg & Hillman, supra note 264, at 223; see also Maggio, supra note 87, at 27
(“[P]erformance-based funding initiatives were rapidly proliferating but were not resulting in desired
impact or improvement.”).
268. Tandberg & Hillman, supra note 264, at 229 (“Increasing total baccalaureate degree
completions is the most frequently cited goal . . . .”).
269. Id. at 236.
270. Dowd, supra note 264, at 109.
271. KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 4.
272. Tandberg & Hillman, supra note 264, at 239.
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were typically timid: states would either link a very small percentage (too small to
inspire meaningful change) of an institution’s budget to student outcomes or create
a pot of money that institutions could win as a bonus on top of their base
funding.”273 Finally, too many funding policies are enrollment driven. They
encourage IHEs “to bring students in the front door but provide less incentive to
make sure they progress all the way through—or actually learn anything in
the process.”274
CONCLUSION
Higher education offers students opportunities for both economic and
intellectual advancement. While both are important, this Article has focused
primarily on economic advancement because value-added measures of institutional
effectiveness can be both contested and contentious.275 In addition, the American
higher education funding system—which is predicated on individuals debt-funding
their own educations—encourages research to focus on economic growth. Even if
a student receives an excellent education while in school, if that student cannot
repay their educational debt, they will suffer hardship.
This Article has considered three ways that states could serve as stewards of
higher educational quality and ensure that students receive a positive return on their
economic investments. States can and should ensure that students attend
high-quality IHEs by refusing to reauthorize IHEs that fail new, state-based CDR
metrics and gainful employment rules, or that fail to demonstrate that they have the
financial wherewithal to stay open for a student’s entire time in college. Without
state authorization, IHEs will lose access to Title IV funds, forcing many low-value
IHEs to improve or close. Generally speaking, this ought to protect students. Only
by vigorously protecting students by policing institutional quality will states fulfill
their role as a member of the program integrity triad.

273.
274.
275.

KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 3.
Id.
DOUGLAS N. HARRIS, VALUE-ADDED MEASURES IN EDUCATION: WHAT EVERY
EDUCATOR NEEDS TO KNOW (2011); see also Itzkowitz, supra note 21 (“[T]here’s still minimal
consensus on how to accurately gauge the value that students get from attending a specific higher
education institution or program.”).
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